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New Labor Law Reform Variations on an Old Theme:
Is the Employee Free Choice Act the Answer?
William B. Gould, IV*
Modem American labor law emerged alongside of the
spectacular growth of industrial unions in the form of the Congress
of Industrial Organizations during the Great Depression, long after
the American Federation of Labor, representing skilled tradesmen
and craftsmen, had come to the fore in the previous century.' The
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935 promoted the
public policy of freedom of association and collective bargaining
that remains with us today, and it did so through creating a system
of secret ballot box elections to resolve disputes about
representation and an unfair labor practice system, a kind of "code
of conduct" initially applicable exclusively to employers. The
Act-then and today-contains a trinity of principles, i.e., the
concept of exclusive bargaining representative status, which
imposed an obligation upon the employer to bargain with the
single union chosen by a majority of employees; the concept of an
appropriate unit, or grouping of employees, who would be
represented by a labor organization of their own choosing; and the
principle of majority rule itself.
In the 1940s and '50s the trade union movement grew
dramatically, its growth fueled in substantial part by the War Labor
Board during the crisis of World War II,2 and ultimately the
merging of CIO and AFL in 1955 at the time of the trade union
movement's zenith-a position of strength that at that point
seemed to be substantially unaffected by the Taft-Hartley
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1. WALTER GALENSON, THE CIO CHALLENGE TO THE AFL: A HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT, 1935-41, at 3-4 (1960).
2. See generally JAMES B. ATLESON, LABOR AND THE WARTIME STATE:
LABOR RELATIONS AND LAW DURING WORLD WAR 11 (1998); Jesse Freidin &
Francis J. Ulman, Arbitration and the National War Labor Board, 58 HARV. L.
REV. 309 (1945).
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amendments of 1947, which put new restrictions upon organized
labor.
3
After the 1935 legislation, the statute was amended not only in
1947 but again through the Landrum-Griffin amendments in 1959,
which both provided for a bill of rights for individual union
members vis-A-vis their unions and, more relevant to the issues
discussed in this Article, the new union unfair labor practices
restricting picketing and certain types of clauses in collective
bargaining agreements. 4 For the past half century, except for some
extension of jurisdiction in 1974, there have been no substantial
amendments affecting labor-management relations.
In Part I of this Article, I discuss some of the ways in which
labor law got off the track from the 1960s and early '70s onward
and the form that law reform proposals took. Part II analyzes the
recognition machinery and the debate about it that emerged with
some focus upon the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA or the
"Proposed Bill") of 2007 and proposals discussed subsequent to
that time. Part III examines proposals about so-called first contract
arbitration as a means to resolve differences in negotiating
contracts in the wake of a union's certification as exclusive
bargaining representative. Part IV discusses the proposals relating
to remedies for violations of the NLRA and the difficulties with
them today. Part V deals with other labor law reform proposals,
particularly concerning the method of appointment of National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the "Board") members. Part VI
examines some new voluntary initiatives, particularly those of the
British multinational FirstGroup America dealing with promoting
freedom of association on a private basis and the implications of
such for public law. Part VII analyzes the NLRA jurisdiction and
the fact that today's law has expanded considerably the breadth of
the NLRA and proposes that state regulation could provide for the
expansion of state law over employers that federal law should not
cover. Part VIII addresses the need for rulemaking in lieu of
adjudication, which has been the only method for NLRB case
dispute resolution.
3. Cf William B. Gould, Taft-Hartley Comes to Great Britain, 81 YALE
L.J. 1421 (1972). On some of the developments in the Thatcher '80s and '90s in
Britain, see John Pencavel, The Surprising Retreat of Union Britain, in SEEKING
A PREMIER ECONOMY: THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF BRITISH ECONOMIC
REFORMS, 1980-2000, 181 (David Card et al. eds., 2004); EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS
AT WORK (K.D. Ewing ed. 2001).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C), (e); cf Bernard D. Meltzer, Organizational
Picketing and the NLRB: Five on a Seesaw, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 78 (1962).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The need for reform in the basic labor law of the United States
has been recognized, discussed, and debated for the past half
century, beginning with the Pucinski Committee report in the
1960s. Even prior to that development, the alarm had been
sounded by scholars and journalists who focused upon the decline
of labor from its zenith in 1955 when approximately thirty-five
percent of employees belonged to trade unions. The numerical
decline accelerated over the years, particularly in the hostile
decades of the 1980s and 2000s. Simultaneously, the problem of
deficiencies in the creaky administrative processes of the NLRB-
through which justice delayed is so often justice denied-has
grown worse over the years. This provided an unfolding drama in
the form of the statute's inadequate remedies as defined by both
the NLRB itself6 and the Supreme Court!
7
Along the way, the debate at times has been confused and has
wandered off course. The most recent of many reform efforts has
emerged in the form of EFCA-a bill passed by the House of
Representatives in 2007.8 The Proposed Bill, as currently written,
provides for (1) a system of recognition in which the ballot box
5. Administration of the Labor-Management Relations Act by the NLRB:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Nation Labor Relations Board of the H.
Comm. on Education and Labor, 87th Cong. (1961). See generally Theodore J.
St. Antoine, A Touchstone for Labor Board Remedies, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 1039
(1968); William B. Gould IV, Prospects for Labor-Law Reform, THE NATION,
Apr. 16, 1977, at 466.
6. See Nabors Ala. Drilling, Inc. 325 N.L.R.B. 574 (1998) (Chairman
Gould, dissenting in part) (lamenting the majority's refusal to overturn Board
precedent barring issuance of non-majority bargaining orders); Ex-Cell-O Corp.,
185 N.L.R.B. 107, 108 (1970) (holding that the statute does not authorize an
award of lost compensation attributable to an employer's resort to administrative
avenues that delay the NLRB process), modified sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 449
F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1971), modified sub nom. Ex-Cell-0 Corp. v. NLRB, 449
F.2d 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
7. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 109 (1970) (holding that the
NLRB is precluded from imposing any contract term as a remedy); Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 198 (1941) (holding that the remedies of
the Act provide compensation that requires mitigation of damages and the
deduction of interim earnings from back pay); Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB,
311 U.S. 7, 11-12 (1940) (holding that the NLRB is precluded from imposing
punitive damages).
8. H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (2007); for a discussion of the bill as passed by
the House of Representatives, see William B. Gould IV, Employee Free Choice
Act: Bill No Cure-All for What Ails Labor, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 6,
2007, at 11 A. For the most recent developments (as of this writing), see Steven
Greenhouse, Democrats Drop Key Part of Bill to Assist Unions, N.Y. TIMES,
July 17, 2009, at Al.
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will be displaced by authorization cards as a means to determine
union majority support; (2) arbitration to resolve first-contract
disputes where labor and management are unable to voluntarily
negotiate a collective bargaining agreement within a four month
period; and (3) new procedures for law enforcement.
The suggestion has been made-and it has been fueled by
considerable rhetoric 9-that reform in the law can both
substantially reverse the membership decline of organized labor
and promote a more middle-class America. But, of course, this
overlooks the fact that many other factors are responsible for the
decline of the unions and that the law, while relevant, is
subordinate to most of them. And the decline, which is so often
measured in international terms, fails to take into account the fact
that it is Continental Europe that has possessed relatively
centralized systems unrestrained by the American individual
exceptionalism and the prominence of antitrust law since the turn
of the previous century. 0 The difference between the systems lies
in principal part between the coverage of employees through trade
union initiatives, which includes nonmembers by virtue of various
extension systems in Germany, the Netherlands, and France.
(France provides the most dramatic example with ten percent
union membership at a lower level than the Americans, but with
eighty percent of employees in the workforce covered by trade
union negotiations!'1) The decentralized American system, which
9. See, e.g., Strengthening America's Middle Class Through the Employee
Free Choice Act: Hearing on H.R. 800 Before the Subcomm. on Health,
Employment, Labor, and Pensions of the H. Comm. on Education and Labor,
10th Cong. (2007) (statement of Harley Shaiken). Contra Posting of Richard
Posner to The Becker-Posner Blog, http://www.becker-posner-blog.com (Jan. 25,
2009, 21:49 CST). For an attack upon reforms contained in EFCA and, indeed, the
NLRA itself, see Richard Epstein, The Case Against the Employee Free Choice
Act (John M. Olin L. & Econ. Working Paper, No. 452 (2d Series), 2009),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract id= 1337185#.
10. For the development of antitrust law as a significant feature on the
American legal landscape, see Standard Oil Co. of NJ., 221 U.S. 1 (1911);
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST
LAW (3d ed. 2005). Antitrust law, of course, played a major role in thwarting
trade union development. This changed appreciably with United States v.
Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941); Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers,
268 U.S. 295 (1925); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443
(1921); Loewe v. Lawlor (Danbury Hatters), 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
11. MICHAEL M. HARRIS, HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 168 (2007). See generally John Logan, Union
Recognition and Collective Bargaining: How Does the United States Compare
with Other Democracies?, PERSPECTIVES ON WORK ONLINE COMPANION,
Spring 2009, http://www.lera.uiuc.edu/Pubs/Perspectives/onlinecompanion/
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in its sophisticated and detailed dispute resolution machinery is the
product of comprehensive plant level bargaining, does not apply
beyond the plant, or to a lesser extent the company, and
infrequently across corporate lines through multiemployer
association bargaining.
Thus, institutionally the American system starts at a
disadvantage in acquiring union membership and influence, and
this, along with other factors, makes the law a secondary factor in
any process of change. It is possible that law reform-particularly
if unions can obtain compulsory recognition for collective
bargaining purposes on the basis of employee-executed
authorization cards, as EFCA proposed until recently 2-- can
produce more union members. But more than this is needed to alter
the membership terrain. One obvious matter that needs redress is
immigration law and the status of undocumented workers,
addressed already fairly unsuccessfully by labor law.1 3 Only
immigration law can address the actual status of such employees,
as the current status places such workers effectively beyond union
organizational efforts with or without labor law reform.
14
Nonetheless, millions are being spent by both labor and
management in the battle of labor law reform. Neither side shows
any interest in a sensible or moderate compromise at this juncture,
though it seems obvious from the merits of the debate as well as
the political composition of the members of the United States
Senate-in which a filibuster will have to be broken by sixty
Spring2009Voll0/Logan.html. See generally Derek Bok, Reflections on the
Distinctive Character ofAmerican Labor Laws, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1461 (1971).
12. The authorization card provision of EFCA appears to have been
dropped in an effort to strike a compromise. Greenhouse, supra note 8 ("A half-
dozen Senators friendly to labor have decided to drop a central provision of a
bill that would have made it easier to organize workers .... [t]he abandonment
of card check was another example of the power of moderate Democrats.").
13. See A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 408 (1995),
aff'd, 159 F.3d 1345 (2d Cir. 1998), abrogated by Hoffman Plastic Compounds,
Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (holding that the Board may not award back
pay to illegal, undocumented workers).
14. Said the New York Times:
If you uphold workers' rights, even for those here illegally, you uphold
them for all working Americans. If you ignore and undercut the rights
of illegal immigrants, you encourage the exploitation that erodes
working conditions and job security everywhere. In a time of economic
darkness, the stability and dignity of the work force are especially vital.
Editorial, Getting Immigration Right, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2008, at A38.
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votes-that some kind of intermediate position is the only one that
can be obtained. 15
The debate in 2009 has taken a number of confusing turns. In
the first place, frequent reference is made to Canada by many of
the relatively sophisticated, who apparently believe that the
Canadian experience contains a model that supports the card check
approach to recognition. This is not so. Indeed, the Canadian
experience is precisely to the contrary. Though all jurisdictions at
both the federal and provincial level--Canadian labor law in
contrast to American is principally provincial law, 16 not federal
law' 7-adhered to a card check system in the 1960s, the majority
of jurisdictions have switched to secret ballot box elections, and
the trend is in that direction.18
Today, only the federal jurisdiction (which covers industries
like transportation and banking) and the provinces of Quebec,
Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, and Manitoba have a card
check system. What is particularly important is that a majority of
provinces have not only gone over to the secret ballot box as a
basis for recognition, but also a consensus in favor of the ballot
15. See Greenhouse, supra note 8 ("[s]enators decided to scrap [the card
check provision] to help secure a filibuster-proof 60 votes .... "). See also
Steven Greenhouse, Union Head Would Back Bill Without Card Check, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 5, 2009, at B3.
16. See generally GEORGE W. ADAMS, CANADIAN LABOUR LAW 1.120-
1.130 (2d ed. 2004) ("Provincial jurisdiction [is a] characteristic of Canadian
labour law that distinguishes it from approaches in the United States . ").
17. See Machinists Lodge 76 v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm., 427
U.S. 132 (1976) (noting that the states must yield to federal jurisdiction if the
activities the states desire to regulate are encompassed in the NLRA); San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (holding that the states'
jurisdiction over subject matter normally relegated to the NLRB is displaced,
even when the NLRB has declined to assert jurisdiction over the dispute in
question). See generally William B. Gould, The Garmon Case: Decline and
Threshold of "Litigating Elucidation ", 39 U. DET. L.J. 539, 556 (1962).
18. E-mail from Tom Archibald, Heenan Blaikie to Author (May 9, 2009,
10:06 pm PST) (on file with author). For an extensive discussion of relevant
Canadian provisions of law, which relate to the contemporary labor law reform
debate in the United States, see Kenneth G. Love, Q.C., Chairperson,
Saskatchewan Labour Relations Board, Speech at the Association of Labor
Relations Agencies Conference (July 20, 2009) (copy on file with author); Pierre
Flageole, Vice-Chair, Commission des relations du travail du Qudbec, Card
Check and First Contract Arbitration: the Quebec Experience, Association of
Labor Relations Agencies Conference (July 20, 2009) (copy on file with author);
Ginette Brazeau, Canada Industrial Relations Board, Canadian Experience with
Certification by Card Check and First Agreement Arbitration, Association of
Labor Relations Agencies Conference (July 20, 2009) (copy on file with author);
Geoffrey England, Evaluating the Merits of the 2008 Reforms to Collective
Bargaining in Saskatchewan, 71 SASK. L. REv. 307 (2008).
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election has stabilized. Alberta has had the vote since 1988, and
Nova Scotia since 1972 (though there have been switches in the
interim since then).19 Ontario, by far the largest province, has led
the way toward ballots since 1995-and expedited ballots at that,
requiring that the election take place within one week subsequent
to the filing of the petition!20 Newfoundland has had the vote since
1993, British Columbia since 2001, and, more recently,
Saskatchewan since 2008 after remaining in the card check camp
21since 1964. Some supporters of EFCA seem to assume that the
shift is toward card check rather than ballots-but the opposite is
true!
Finally, there have been debates about what EFCA means, as
one might expect with any legislation of import. But one of the
most confusing aspects of this relates to the Proposed Bill's
treatment of the secret ballot itself. In fact, EFCA provides that
recognition on the basis of union authorization cards will supplant
the secret ballot box election. Authorization cards are viewed by
unions and employers as facilitating union recognition because (1)
employees are unlikely to be exposed to employer free speech or
anti-union propaganda inasmuch as the cards will be executed in
some instances before the employer is even aware of the union
campaign-or before it is able to mount an anti-union campaign;
(2) employees are at an additional disadvantage because union
organizers have no access to company property in the midst of
one-sided employer anti-union speech-though curiously EFCA
does not provide for the right of union organizers to have access;
(3) the execution of cards in a union hall, local tavern, or other
meeting place frequently attaches less solemnity to the selection
process than casting a secret ballot; and (4) cards may be signed as
the result of peer pressure even when coercion is not present.
Whatever the scope of peer pressure and union coercion has been
in Canada-and the treatises addressing Canadian labor law
contain many references to such casesV2 -it is obviously a less
deliberative process than casting the secret ballot.
At the same time, the Canadian experience seems to
demonstrate that union recognition may have been easier to obtain
19. Labour Relations Code s. 34, R.S.A., ch. L 1 (2000); Trade Union Act s.
25, R.S.N.S., ch. 475 (1989).
20. Labour Relations Act s. 8(2), (5), R.S.O., ch. 1 (1995).
21. Labour Relations Act s. 47(1), (2), NFLD. R.S., ch. L 1 (1990). (election
required unless employer and union agree otherwise); Labour Relations Code s.
24, 25, R.S.B.C., ch. 244 (1996) (election must be held within ten days); Trade
Union Act s. 6, S.S., ch. T 17 (1978).
22. See JEFFREY SACK & C. MICHAEL MITCHELL, ONTARIO LABOUR
RELATIONS BOARD LAW AND PRACTICE 176-213 (2d ed. 1985).
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through cards than is the case with ballots. 23 Thus, it would be a
rare union or group of employees who would invoke the ballot
given the fact that cards are such an easier road. That is the point
of the proposal and the expectation of many of EFCA's
proponents, i.e., that trade union membership will rise as the result
of this measure. Accordingly, the ballot will be moribund, rarely
used under these new statutory procedures contained in an
unamended EFCA.
II. THE RECOGNITION PROCESS
As noted, the debate about secret ballot box elections as
opposed to card check has divided largely along labor and
management lines. The unions have argued that cards would
immunize employees from employer self-help and one-sided
propaganda that might either influence or intimidate workers and
thus induce them to vote against the union. Employers, of course,
have noted the obvious, i.e., that employees will get a lopsided
view of the pros and cons of union representation if they only have
the opportunity to listen to one side and that unions can mislead, as
well as pressure or coerce, workers to sign cards in this
environment. Of course, the union assumption is that employees
will be immunized from employer interference for just that
reason-they will not even hear the other side of the argument
contained in the employer's message.
With considerable persuasiveness, unions point out that
nonemployee union organizers are, under virtually all
circumstances, denied access to company property24 and that
employer captive-audience, anti-union messages go unanswered
25
-though EFCA will not change this! Unions also rely upon
23. One commentator notes that "there has been a marked overall decline in
the number of certifications issued by the Board in the years since the
mandatory vote procedure was introduced . . ." and concludes, by statistical
regression, that the passage of legislation prohibiting card check "had a
significant negative impact on certification success rates." Sara Slinn, An
Analysis of the Effects on Parties' Unionization Decisions of the Choice of
Union Representation Procedure: The Strategic Dynamic Certification Model,
43 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 407, 441 (2005). It is not clear to me, however, that the
regression accounts for all relevant factors. Moreover, though union
representation in Canada is more substantial than in the United States, this is in
large part attributable to Canada's larger public sector economy. All struck out:
Weaker than they look, THE ECoNoMIST, Oct. 17, 2009, at 52.
24. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
25. These and related issues are discussed extensively in my dissent in
Beverly Enters.-Haw., Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 335, 361 (1998) (Chairman Gould,
dissenting).
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academic examinations of the rising voluntary use of cards to
resolve recognition issues.26  But the limited number of
controversies and problems emerging here-unions often cite this
experience to suggest that the controversies and litigation under an
EFCA card check law will be infrequent-probably tells us little
about what would happen when cards are used in an adversarial
context in which employers are resisting unions altogether. In other
words, the infrequency of disputes where employers and unions
have voluntarily negotiated such procedures tells us little about
what will happen should the procedures be set by statute.
The unions are right about the ballot-it is discredited, and the
problems with it rest in two factors. The first is the gap between
untrammeled employer free speech and the lack of union free
speech rights at the workplace. This, as noted, can be partially
remedied by providing for union access to private property; the
labor law reform should include this element-EFCA does not!
But the second problem is that of delay, given the fact that most
representation votes taken under existing NLRA procedures will
allow for a lapse of at least fifty to sixty days from the filing of the
petition to the vote itself-and a minority of elections take much
longer! This period of time during which card majorities are often
dissipated is harmful to union organizational efforts.
The delay is caused by disputes prior to the ballot itself-both
potential and actual-over who is eligible to vote and what the
appropriate unit shall be. But the fact that the same delay will exist
in connection with cards does not seem to be widely understood.
The Board cannot determine whether a union has a majority on any
basis until the identity of the voters and the size of the unit is
resolved. Given the fact that the ballot is more likely to be the
product of a deliberative process as compared to cards, I have
advocated an expedited election within five to ten days27--just as
Ontario and British Columbia provide for with considerable
success!
Even though there may be subsequent disputes about eligibility
and the unit following the vote under a vote-now-and-litigate-later
26. See, e.g., Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, NLRB Elections vs. Card
Check Campaigns: Results of a Worker Survey, 62 INDuS. & LAB. REL. REV.
157 (2009).
27. William B. Gould IV, Prospects for Labor Law Reform After the 2008
Election: A Law Perspective, PERSPECTIVES ON WORK ONLINE COMPANION,
Spring 2009, http://www.lera.uiuc.edu/Pubs/Perspectives/onlinecompanion/
Spring2009VollO/Gould.html. See also William B. Gould IV, What Would
Employee Free Choice Mean in the Workplace? (July 20, 2009), available at
http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/publicationspdf/Gould%
20July/o2020%20Speech%20to%20ALRA1 .pdf.
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procedure, such as that favored by the Canadians,28 the votes will
be in the bank, so to speak, and employees will not be influenced
by anti-union messages during the period of litigation subsequent
to the vote where the numbers in dispute at the time of the vote are
outcome-determinative given the count that is finally taken.
Congress should mandate a time limit for resolution of these post-
election issues as well so that the union's representativeness is not
undermined during the period that it takes for the Board to decide
when it is necessary for these issues to be addressed because the
outcome of the election will be affected by their resolution. My
Board in the 1990s used a vote-now-and-litigate-later approach
(albeit not in the context of a Canadian-style expedited election),
and, as it happened in a number of instances in which it was
utilized, it was not necessary to resolve certification because the
votes in dispute were not outcome-determinative. 29 But quite
obviously there will be many close elections, and it will be
28. The Board is obliged to hold a hearing in representation cases. Angelica
Healthcare Servs. Group, Inc., 315 N.L.R.B. 1320, 1321 (1995); cf Bennett
Indus., Inc., 313 N.L.R.B. 1363, 1363 (1994). However, frequently during my
Chairmanship in the Clinton years, resolution of certain issues like eligibility and
unit was not undertaken in the hearing prior to the election. See Toledo Hosp., 315
N.L.R.B. 594, 594 (1994). The policy was even followed, albeit infrequently, by
the Bush II Board. Ne. Iowa Tel. Co., 341 N.L.R.B. 670, 670-71 (2004); cf
Sundor Brands, Inc., 325 N.L.R.B. 499, 501 (1998) (holding that postponed
resolutions can be resolved in unit clarification proceedings), enforcement denied,
168 F.3d 515 (D.C. Cir. 1999); HeartShare Human Servs., 320 N.L.R.B. 1, 3
(1995) enforced, 108 F.3d 467, 470-71 (2d Cir. 1998) (precluding the litigation
relating to a unit issue advanced by the same employer earlier at a different unit so
as to avoid wastefulness and delay). The doctrinal basis for such action existed
earlier. See, e.g., Hamilton Test Sys., N.Y., Inc. v. NLRB, 743 F.2d 136, 140 (2d
Cir. 1984); Med. Ctr. at Bowling Green v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 1091, 1093 (6th Cir.
1983). However, it was rarely used until the Clinton era. See WILLIAM B. GOULD
IV, FOUR-AND-ONE-HALF-YEAR REPORT 21-22 (1998), available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20061003101508/http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/press/relea
ses/r2308.pdf [hereinafter GOULD, REPORT]. NLRB election machinery is
discussed at greater length in William B. Gould IV, The Employee Free Choice
Act of 2009, Labor Law Reform, and What Can Be Done About the Broken System
of Labor-Management Relations Law in the United States, 43 U.S.F. L. REv. 291,
316-22 (2008) [hereinafter Gould, Employee Free Choice Act of2009]. For earlier
discussions of labor law reform in this era, see WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA
FOR REFORM (1993) [hereinafter GOULD, AGENDA FOR REFORM]; Paul Weiler,
Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for Union
Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351, 352 (1984); Paul Weiler, Promises to
Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV.
L. REv. 1769, 1770 (1983).
29. This was the case, for example, in Columbia Hospital for Women
Medical Center, Case 5-RC-140331, and Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., Case 5-
RC-1435. For a brief discussion of this procedure, see GOULD, REPORT, supra
note 28.
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important for the Board to discharge its responsibilities promptly
so that employees do not lose faith in the process of collective
bargaining in the interim. Employers are also well served by a
process that brings contact with legal institutions to an end
promptly.
Again, a particularly important point here is that the votes are
in the bank under an expedited procedure; thus, employees cannot
be influenced by anti-union conduct or expressions of a view after
the votes are cast. But the same can also be said of the execution of
authorization cards while disputes about eligibility and unit are
resolved subsequent to their submission to the Board. However,
there are two additional complexities relating to cards that do not
pertain to the ballot. In the first place, notwithstanding the
numerous and well-publicized disputes about "hanging chads" and
the like in political elections, there are very few disputes about the
ballot itself.30 The same is not true of cards, 31 though presumably
the rules and regulations of a new Obama Board devised under the
authority given to it by EFCA will diminish some of the
controversies that have existed with cards under the Act to date
where disputes have been adjudicated within the context of unfair
labor practice litigation addressing the question of whether the
union has majority status where employee free choice in the
30. As in the "hanging chad" controversies, serious disputes tend to center
around divining the voter's intent. In Bishop Mugavero Center, 322 N.L.R.B.
209 (1996), the Board agreed to void a ballot marked with a diagonal line in one
box and an "X" in the other. In TCI West, Inc. v. NLRB, 145 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir.
1998), the court refused to enforce the Board decision and sided instead with my
dissenting opinion that a ballot marked with a diagonal line in one box and a
darkened, emphasized "X" in the other box should be counted. Bishop
Mugavero, 322 N.L.R.B. at 209 (Chairman Gould, concurring). The Ninth
Circuit overruled the Board's decisions in Bishop Mugavero Center and TC1
West, Inc. that ballots so marked were presumptively unclear and voidable. The
court observed that the Board's general policy was to determine the voter's
intent and held that this policy should be applied uniformly. Following the
direction of the court of appeals, the Board now uniformly counts all ballots
from which the voter's intent can be determined. See Thiele Indus., Inc., 325
N.L.R.B. 1122 (1998) (ballot marked with "X" in YES box, with YES circled,
and a diagonal line in NO box is a clear yes vote); NLRB v. Americold
Logistics, Inc., 214 F.3d 935 (7th Cir. 2000) (enforcing Board's voiding of
ballot marked with the words "neith[e]r nor" written between YES and NO
boxes as ambiguous). That these disputes address such a narrow band of issues
attests to the robustness of the ballot process. Similar issues-and many more-
would arise when certifying authorization cards.
31. There is some evidence that employers are devising new tactics that
resemble the "yellow dog contracts" of the early twentieth century to preempt
union reliance upon cards under a newly enacted EFCA. Steven Greenhouse, A
Dispute Over Unionizing Montana Hair Salons, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 29, 2009, at
A16.
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election process has been contaminated.32 Yet the problem of the
frequently voiced issue of misrepresentation will always be there
because some employees will complain about the circumstances
under which the card was signed, with or without sub rosa
employer connivance. The Board will have to obtain some form of
evidence or testimony about the facts on this and related issues.
A second and related issue will arise in connection with
decertification efforts put forward by employees who maintain that
even if they were not misled or coerced, they have changed their
minds. This has been a major problem that has arisen under the
NLRA as written33 and is frequently linked to the disputes about
the reasonable period of time during which any kind of challenge
to majority status is permitted during the period of time that
collective bargaining is proceeding. Under EFCA, disputes of this
kind will bedevil efforts to bargain a first contract and to arbitrate
if collective bargaining is unsuccessful. In part, this problem can
and should be addressed by requiring elections where employers or
employees do not want to see the collective bargaining process
move forward because of the allegations that the union possesses
no majority status. Under the Act, employers can simply refuse to
bargain, requiring lengthy unfair labor practice proceedings where
the claim is made that a majority of employees no longer support
the union,34 though the Board has made it easier for employers to
challenge a union's representative status if they use the election
machinery rather than trigger an unfair labor practice charge by
refusing to bargain.35 Symmetry requires that an election be
mandated here in contrast to the current situation that allows the
union's status to be challenged through an employer refusal to
32. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). One of the
most difficult problems for Gissel exists because of the fact that many circuits
have taken the position that considerable turnover with substantial passage of
time and changed circumstances at the plant can be a basis for a representation
election and not a Gissel bargaining order. See Overnight Transp. Co. v. NLRB,
280 F.3d 417, 435-36 (4th Cir. 2002); HarperCollins S. F. v. NLRB, 79 F.3d
1324 (2d Cir. 1996); NLRB v. Cell Agric. Mfg. Co., 41 F.3d 389 (8th Cir.
1994); Somerset Welding & Steel, Inc. v. NLRB, 987 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir.
1993); Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 904 F.2d 1156 (7th Cir. 1990);
Impact Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 847 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1988); NLRB v. Koenig
Iron Works, Inc., 856 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1988).
33. See, e.g., Lee Lumber & Bldg. Material Corp. v. NLRB, 117 F.3d 1454
(D.C. Cir. 1997); Caterair Int'l v. NLRB, 22 F.3d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
34. See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998).
35. See Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pac., 333 N.L.R.B. 717 (2001).
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bargain.36 Employers, who are insistent upon retaining the ballot in
the EFCA debate, cannot reasonably oppose a mandatory ballot
where decertification is at issue. Again, under EFCA, as written
where elections are not required either at the time of certification
or decertification, these disputes will be frequently linked to the
question of whether the cards were properly signed in the first
instance-the employees maintaining that they never intended to
support unionization. The same is not true where the ballot has
been cast in an NLRB-supervised election.
Elections are more likely to smooth the way to effective
collective bargaining 37 whether an amended Act contains first
contract arbitration or not. But this will be particularly important
where there is a probability of a contract or a mandate through the
arbitration process as provided by EFCA. The collective
bargaining agreement should be promptly available to the parties
because that is all a union can do for employees that it represents
under our system, and if a contract is not obtained the result will be
decertification de facto or de jure. The point here is that the
collective bargaining process itself is more likely to be bedeviled
with recognition issues under a system that provides for cards
rather than a secret ballot box election because a substantial
number of employers will inevitably challenge the union's
36. Of course, proponents of an unamended EFCA are in an awkward
position to advocate for elections in decertification proceedings while
attempting to supplant them in certification proceedings.
37. The Board accepted the ballot box as superior even prior to the Taft-
Hartley amendments, which mandated elections as a prerequisite to NLRB
certification. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575. The leading early Wagner Act
case is Cudahy Packing Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 526, 531-32 (1939). See also Armour
& Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 567, 572 (1939).
The Board now properly views the ballot box as more deliberative:
[L]ast minute electioneering or pressure, and unfair advantage from
prolonged conversations between representatives of any party to the
election and voters waiting to cast ballots is of sufficient concern to
warrant a strict rule against such conduct, without inquiry into the
nature of the conversations. The final minutes before an employee casts
his vote should be his own, as free from interference as possible.
Furthermore, the standard here applied insures that no party gains a last
minute advantage over the other, and at the same time deprives neither
party of any important access to the ear of the voter.
Michem, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 362 (1968). See also Mediplex of Conn., 319
N.L.R.B. 281, 298 (1995) (affirming the administrative law judge's finding that
"victory party" remark by union agent did not amount to "sustained
conversation with waiting prospective voters prohibited by Mitchem, Inc. 170
N.L.R.B. 362 (1968)"); Patrick Industries, Inc., 318 N.L.R.B. 245, 256 (1995)
(affirming the administrative law judge's finding that supervisors had not
engaged in lengthy conversations as the employees made their way to the
polling area and that the supervisors were present for work-related reasons).
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legitimacy and representative status in the midst of collective
bargaining where cards are the basis for recognition-so too will
some employees in certain circumstances.
The idea of ballots by mail or post rather than casting them at
the employer facilities has been discussed as a possible EFCA
compromise. 38 In my judgment, an amendment to the Act
providing for a postal ballot rather than one at the employer
facilities would not be required since the statute does not mandate
that the ballot be cast in a particular place or location but rather
leaves this to the discretion of the Board. Accordingly, in San
Diego Gas & Electric, the Board held that postal ballots could be
cast pursuant to Board mandate. 39 The difficulty is that the poorly
reasoned plurality opinion concluded without statutory support that
postal ballots could be ordered only where (1) eligible voters were
scattered because their job duties took place over a wide
geographical area; (2) the voters were scattered in the sense that
their work schedules would vary significantly so that they were not
present at a common location at common times; or (3) there was a
strike, lockout, or picketing in progress and some of the employees
were not at plant facilities because they were honoring the picket
line, were locked out, or engaged in the strike.4 °
In effect, even though the plurality noted that mail ballots have
been conducted ever since the NLRA was enacted and that there
were no abuses associated with them, it adopted a presumption
against holding them. This view seemed to be rooted in the
hostility of employers to postal ballots rather than the existing
statutory framework. In a concurring opinion, I expressed my
disagreement with these limited criteria and stated that elections
can be conducted by postal ballot not only to enfranchise scattered
voters but also to conserve NLRB resources, given the fact that
only clericals are needed to mail the ballots out as opposed to
utilizing NLRB professional staff to go to a facility and spend time
there and incur hotel expenses, etc.4 (This was particularly true in
38. Kris Maher, Specter Suggests Changes to Union Bill, WALL ST. J., May
16, 2009, at A2.
39. San Diego Gas & Elec. v. NLRB, 325 N.L.R.B. 1143 (1998). The
National Mediation Board (NMB), which has jurisdiction over railway and
airline workers, has utilized telephone electronic voting. See Tel. Elec. Voting,
29 N.M.B. No. 90 (Sept. 25, 2002); cf Pinnacle Airlines, Inc. v. Nat'l Mediation
Bd., No. 03-1642 (ESH), 2003 WL 23156630, at *6 (D.D.C. 2003) (upholding
NMB certification of an election conducted via telephone voting). The process is
described in Tel. Elec. Voting, 30 N.M.B. No. 80 (Sept. 30, 2003); see also Tel.
Elec. Voting Comment Period, 30 N.M.B. No. 56 (June 19, 2003); Internet
Voting Comment Period, 34 N.M.B. No. 41 (Sept. 14, 2007).
40. Id. at 1145.
41. Id. at 1147 (Chairman Gould, concurring).
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the '90s when the Board was confronted with appropriations
problems.)
One of the principal objections of the dissent to mail ballots
was to be found in the employer's inability to use the captive
audience close to the time that the employees cast their votes since
the twenty-four-hour prohibition against such techniques was
clocked from twenty-four hours prior to the time the Board sends
out their ballot, in contrast to the twenty-four-hour period prior to
the actual casting of the votes in the employer's facility.42 I noted
that the Board was under no compulsion to enhance employer anti-
union free speech though the right to communicate for employers
and unions is protected by the statute. 4 3 Moreover, my concurring
opinion stated that the employer's voice was not silenced during
the campaign, inasmuch as the captive audience is not its "only
method of communication," and that employers could
communicate with the workers through other means such as
literature, one-on-one conversations, and the like. I expressed the
view that during the time that the election process was established,
when NLRB agents first visited the plant facilities, frequently
employers had sent the message to employees that management,
through control of the plant facilities on which the Board would
conduct the vote, controlled the entire process. I said in San Diego
Gas & Electric: "[S]ome employers attempt to direct the Board
agent and the procedures surrounding the election in a way that
creates the appearance in the eyes of the employees that their
42. Id. at 1151 (Members Hurtgen and Brame, dissenting) (citing Or. Wash.
Tel. Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 339, 341 (1959) (applying Peerless Plywood Co., 107
N.L.R.B. 427 (1953) to mail ballot cases)).
43. The right of employer free speech under the Act has been established by
the Supreme Court:
The NLRB took the position that § 8 demanded employer neutrality
during organizing campaigns, reasoning that any partisan employer
speech about unions would interfere with the § 7 rights of employees ....
In 1941, this Court curtailed the NLRB's aggressive interpretation,
clarifying that nothing in the NLRA prohibited an employer from
"expressing his view on labor policies or problems" unless the
employer's speech "in connection with other circumstances [amongst]
the coercion within the meaning of the Act" . . . We subsequently
characterized Virginia Electric as recognizing the First Amendment right
of employers to engage in non-coercive speech about unionization.
Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408, 2413 (2008)
(citations omitted). Curiously, the Obama Administration has promulgated a
federal executive order remarkably similar to the California statute invalidated
in Chamber of Commerce v. Brown. Exec. Order No. 13,494, 74 Fed. Reg. 6101
(Feb. 4, 2009). Cf Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union
Representation Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495 (1993).
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employer controls not only their salary and benefits but also the
Board's procedures." 44
Manual ballot procedures, I stated, had been "manipulated by
sophisticated employers and labor consultants in ways that mail
ballots cannot be manipulated. ' '45  Though the dissenters
emphasized the potential for union interference with the employee
vote-casting, I pointed to the history of the Railway Labor Act
(RLA), covering the railroads and airlines, 46 where the postal
ballot is the rule and not the exception, and to the virtual absence
of objections to union conduct under the RLA as well as the
NLRA.
47
Because this view did not carry the day in the Clinton Board, it
seems appropriate for Congress to provide more substantial,
explicit discretion, at a minimum, for the Board to order postal
ballots along the lines that I propounded in my San Diego Gas &
Electric concurring opinion. This approach should not be viewed
as an alternative to expedited elections. It is possible, and indeed
even more practicable, for the Board to order the election within
the same abbreviated period subsequent to the filing of a petition
for representation, as provided for in Ontario and British
Columbia, and at the same time allow the employees to have a
week or two to cast their ballots. The important point here is that
ballots actually be mailed out within the expedited period. From
that point on, both the employer and the union are "prohibited from
making election speeches on company time to massed assemblies
of employees. ' '4S If the union breaches confidentiality or interferes
44. Id. at 1148 (Chairman Gould, concurring).
45. Id. at 1148 n.3.
46. Id. at 1147 n.1.
47. The Board briefly surveyed the history of the RLA in London's Farm
Dairy, Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 1057, 1058 (1997).
48. In Or. Wash. Tel. Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 339, 341 (1959), the Board found:
Henceforth, the Regional Director will give the parties written notice
setting forth the time and date on which "mail in" ballots will be
dispatched to the voters, and also setting forth a terminal time and date
by which the ballots must be returned to the Regional Office. Such
notice will be given the parties at least 24 hours before the time and
date on which the ballots will be dispatched by the Regional Office.
Employers and unions alike will be prohibited from making election
speeches on company time to massed assemblies of employees within
the period set forth in the notice, i.e., from the time and date on which
the "mail in" ballots are scheduled to be dispatched by the Regional
Office until the terminal time and date prescribed for their return.
Violations of this rule by employers or unions will cause an election to
be set aside whenever valid objections are filed.
The employer obligation to provide the union with names and addresses of
employees under Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966), will
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in some other way with the employees' free choice, that ought to
be a violation of the statute and perhaps a basis for setting aside the
results of the election under the current Act and under the
amendments to be enacted.
III. FIRST CONTRACT ARBITRATION
Under the NLRA, a contract may not be imposed through an
NLRB remedy, 49 although the parties are obliged to enter into a
written agreement when they have negotiated an agreement and
one side refuses to put it in writing in the form of a collective
bargaining agreement. 50 Under EFCA, unresolved disputes relating
to wages, hours, and working conditions may proceed to
arbitration in first contract bargaining. This is so-called "interest
arbitration," relatively unknown and rare in the United States,
where the arbitrator has authority to impose an award that provides
for a new contract-in contrast to "grievance" or "rights"
arbitration where the impartial third party is interpreting the
agreement that has been negotiated among the parties. The fact that
this is so unusual does not argue against its legislative adoption.
5
'
But, along with other factors, it ought to make Congress
particularly cautious and very careful in devising its approach.
52
have to be expedited under a new statute providing for expedited elections, i.e.,
within two or three days subsequent to the filing of a petition.
49. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 103 (1970).
50. H.J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514, 524-26 (1941).
51. But see Catherine Fisk, Interest Arbitration in the Employee Free Choice
Act: A Time-Honored and Tested Method to Ensure Good-Faith Bargaining, in
ACADEMICS ON EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE 38 (John Logan ed. 2009), available at
http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/laborlaw/efca09.pdf, Catherine L. Fisk & Adam R.
Pulver, First Contract Arbitration and The Employee Free Choice Act, 70 LA. L.
REV. 47 (2009).
52. Under NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342
(1958), the parties are obliged to bargain to the point of impasse over a mandatory
subject of bargaining. Interest arbitration-in contrast to grievance arbitration-
such as is contemplated by EFCA, providing for arbitral resolution of future
contract terms, is a nonmandatory subject of bargaining because it substitutes a
third party for labor and management in the collective bargaining process. NLRB
v. Columbus Printing Pressmen & Assistants' Local 252, 543 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir.
1976); La Crosse Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 271 N.L.R.B. 250 (1984); Sheet Metal
Workers Int'l Local 59, 227 N.L.R.B. 520 (1976). However, though the circuits
are split, interest arbitration awards in the private sector are judicially enforceable
generally. See, e.g., Chattanooga Mailers Local 92 v. Chattanooga News-Free
Press, 524 F.2d 1305, 1315 (6th Cir. 1975); Chattanooga Mailers Local 92 v.
Chattanooga News-Free Press, 524 F.2d 1305, 1315 (6th Cir. 1975); Winston-
Salem Printing Pressmen Local 318 & Assistants' Local 318 v. Piedmont Publ'g
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And when the Senate addresses this bill it must make certain that
particular criteria, e.g., comparability in the industry and in related
industries and cost of living increases, are explicitly written into
the statute. To fail to do so is not only bad policy but also may
render the arbitration provisions in EFCA unconstitutional.
Under EFCA, collective bargaining is to commence not later
than ten days after a written request for bargaining subsequent to
certification, and if no agreement is reached within ninety days, the
parties may initiate third-party intervention through mediation
from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, which, if
unsuccessful, may refer the unresolved dispute to an interest
arbitration panel. Thus, the commencement of collective
bargaining, the use of mediation culminating in arbitration, is to
take place over a four-month period-a period of time
considerably more abbreviated than that contained in the NLRA
that, through its protection of the relationship, bars virtually any
challenge to the union's majority status during a full certification
year and, thus, assumes that collective bargaining will take place
during this time.5 4 On the one hand, it is important that bargaining
move forward promptly. On the other hand, the parties are often
confronted with numerous issues and considerable challenges in
addressing them for the first time as they make a new contract and
a new relationship. Quite clearly this matter needs to be addressed,
for as Professors Ferguson and Kochan have found, only fifty-six
percent of newly certified bargaining units are successful in
reaching a first contract-and only thirty-eight percent are able to
Co., 393 F.2d 221, 227 (4th Cir. 1968); A. Seltzer & Co. v. Livingston, 253 F.
Supp. 509, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), affd, 361 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1966); Builders
Ass'n of Kan. City v. Kan. City Laborers, 326 F.2d 867, 869 (8th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 917 (1964).
But see Boston Printing Pressmen's Union v. Potter Press, 141 F. Supp. 553, 557-
58 (D. Mass. 1956) (holding that "quasi-legislative" arbitration is not enforceable),
affd, 241 F.2d 787 (1st Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 817 (1957).
53. Hess Collection Winery v. Cal. Agric. Labor Relations Bd., 45 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 609, 627 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (upholding an interest arbitration statute
against a constitutional challenge because the Act has adequate standards in
place to allow for judicial review). Cf Jerre S. Williams, The Compulsory
Settlement of Contract Negotiation Labor Disputes, 27 TEx. L. REv. 587 (1949)
(comprehensively surveying interest arbitration in the U.S. and abroad sixty
years ago).
54. In Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954), the Supreme Court held that the
presumption that the union holds majority status is irrebuttable during the first
year after certification. The implication is that first contract bargaining will
continue for at least a year and the fledgling bargaining relationship deserves
protection during that period. But EFCA contains a much more accelerated time
period.
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do so within the first year."5 Even the Bush-appointed General
Counsel of the NLRB has noted that "initial contract bargaining
constitutes a critical stage of the negotiation process because it
forms the foundation for the parties' future labor-management
relationship.
5 6
Of course, some of the problems with first contract
negotiations are exacerbated by Board and circuit court law that
either make collective bargaining more difficult or do little to
promote it. Illustrative of the latter is the so-called "surface
bargaining" line of authority where the complaint is that the
employer is simply going through the motions about meeting with
the union but by its posture on all issues at the table evinces an
unwillingness to consummate a collective bargaining agreement.
57
EFCA will mandate injunctions against employer unfair labor
practices during first year contracts as well as in the midst of
organizing campaigns. Yet these first contract negotiation cases
alleging an unlawful refusal to bargain are always more difficult to
prove and are extremely fact-intensive. This suggests that other
55. JOHN-PAUL FERGUSON & THOMAS A. KOCHAN, MIT SLOAN SCHOOL OF
MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE FOR WORK AND EMPLOYMENT MANAGEMENT,
SEQUENTIAL FAILURES IN WORKERS' RIGHT TO ORGANIZE 1 (2008), http://www.
americanrightsatwork.org/dmdocuments/sequential-failures-in-workers-right_to
_organize 3 25 2008.pdf.
56. Memorandum from Ronald Meisburg, General Counsel, NLRB, to All
Regional Directors, Officers-in-Charge and Resident Officers (Apr. 19, 2006),
available at http://www.nlrb.gov/shared-files/gc%20memo/2008/gc%2008-09%
20submission%20o/o2Ofirst%20contract%20bargaining%20to%20div%/o20f 1 /o
20advice.pdf. See also Micah Berul, To Bargain or Not to Bargain Should Not
Be the Question: Deterring Section 8(a)(5) Violations in First-Time Bargaining
Situations through a Liberalized Standard for the Award of Litigation and
Negotiation Costs, 18 LAB. LAW. 27 (2002).
57. See, e.g., Bryant & Stratton Bus. Inst. Inc. v. NLRB, 140 F.3d 169 (2d
Cir. 1998); NLRB v. A-1 King Size Sandwiches, Inc., 732 F.2d 872 (1 1th Cir.
1984); Pease Co. v. NLRB, 666 F.2d 1044 (6th Cir. 1981); Pittsburgh-Des
Moines Corp. v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Reed & Prince
Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1953). See generally Archibald Cox, The Duty
to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1401 (1958). On the sometimes
vexatious problems related to bargaining tactics, see Gen. Elec. Co., 150
N.L.R.B. 192 (1964), enfd sub nom NLRB v. Gen. Elec. Co., 418. F.2d 736 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 965 (1970); James A. Gross, Donald E.
Cullen, and Kurt L. Hanslowe, Good Faith in Labor Negotiations: Tests and
Remedies, 53 CORNELL.L.REv. 1009 (1968) ("Boulwarism"). See also White
Cap, Inc., 325 N.L.R.B. 1166 (1998), enfd sub nom. Chi. Local No. 458-3M,
Graphic Commc'ns Int'l Union v. NLRB, 206 F.3d. 22 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(regressive bargaining); Telescope Casual Furniture, Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 588
(1998) (take-it-or-leave-it bargaining).
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approaches are important, including, as I discuss below, some
limited availability of interest arbitration.
58
Some of the former cases frequently consist of the so-called
"duty to provide information" case law which is part of the
employer's duty to bargain in good faith. In these cases, some of
the most difficult litigation circles around the issue of whether
parties have reached impasse so that the employer can unilaterally
change working conditions, 60 notwithstanding the presence of
unremedied unfair labor practices that have occurred during the
collective bargaining process itself.61 Other cases stem directly
from a half-century-old Supreme Court decision authored by
Justice Black, NLRB v. Truitt Manufacturing Co., where the Court
held that the employer generally must open its books and disclose
financial information when it claims an inability to pay.62 Said the
Court:
58. A major difficulty here and elsewhere in American labor-management
relations lies in the ability of employers to permanently replace economic
strikers, thus substantially eroding a vital self-help tactic for unions. NLRB v.
Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938); Joseph P. Norelli, Permanent
Replacements: Time for a New Look?, 24 LAB. LAW. 97 (2008) (advocating for
the elimination of the required presumption that an employee's motives are
legitimate when using permanent, rather than temporary, employees).
Sometimes Canadian labor law predicates the availability of arbitration upon a
union's strike vote. But Mackay renders this requirement irrelevant in the
American context. This quid pro quo approach between the strike and peaceful
methods of dispute resolution has found favor in the United States within the
context of negotiated grievance arbitration machinery. See Textile Workers
Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); United Steelworkers v.
Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local
770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); William B. Gould IV, On Labor Injunctions, Unions,
and the Judges: The Boys Markets Case, 1970 SUP. CT. REv. 215; William B.
Gould IV, On Labor Injunctions Pending Arbitration: Recasting Buffalo Forge,
30 STAN. L. REv. 533 (1978).
59. See, e.g., NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967). See
generally Florian Bartosic & Roger C. Hartley, The Employer's Duty to Supply
Information to the Union-A Study of the Interplay of Administrative and
Judicial Rationalization, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 23, 28 (1972).
60. Taft Broad. Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475 (1967) (defining "impasse" and
announcing factors relevant to the determination of whether parties have reached
it), review denied sub nom. Am. Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 395 F.2d
622 (D.C. Cir. 1968). There are some circumstances in which an employer is
precluded from making unilateral changes even subsequent to impasse.
McClatchy Newspapers, 321 NLRB 1386 (1996), enforced, 131 F.3d 1026
(D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998).
61. See, e.g., Alwin Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 192 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
62. 351 U.S. 149 (1956). Justice Frankfurter in his partial concurrence
would have found:
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The ability of an employer to increase wages without injury
to his business is a commonly considered factor in wage
negotiations. Claims for increased wages have sometimes
been abandoned because of an employer's unsatisfactory
business condition[s]; employees have even voted to accept
wage decreases because of such conditions.
Good-faith bargaining necessarily requires that claims
made by either bargainer should be honest claims. This is
true [of] an asserted inability to pay an increase in wages. If
such an argument is important enough to present in the give
and take of [collective] bargaining, it is important enough
to require some sort of proof of its accuracy .... We agree
with the Board that a refusal to attempt to substantiate a
claim of inability to pay increased wages may support a
finding of a failure to bargain in good faith.63
But there are two problems here. The first is that sophisticated
employers who really base their position on an inability to pay will
not articulate it if they are concerned with opening their books.
They may claim that other false or partially false reasons are the
basis for their positions-e.g., a comparison between wages of
other employers or wages in other industries. Obfuscation has been
the direct result of the Truitt holding in all too many cases. Perhaps
encouraged by more recent authority discussed below, some
employers will baldly state that they simply want revenues to go
elsewhere, i.e., profit margins rather than labor costs, instead of
saying the magic words that require disclosure-"We have no
resources to pay."
These sections [of the NLRA] obligate the parties to make an honest
effort to come to terms; they are required to try to reach an agreement
in good faith. "Good faith" means more than merely going through the
motions of negotiating; it is inconsistent with a predetermined resolve
not to budge from an initial position. But it is not necessarily
incompatible with stubbornness, or even with what, to an outsider, may
seem unreasonableness. A determination of good faith or of want of
good faith normally can rest only on an inference based upon more or
less persuasive manifestations of another's state of mind. The previous
relations of the parties, antecedent events explaining behavior at the
bargaining table, and the course of negotiations constitute the raw facts
for reaching such a determination. The appropriate inferences to be
drawn from what is often confused and tangled testimony about all this
makes a finding of absence of good faith one for the judgment of the
Labor Board, unless the record as a whole leaves such judgment
without reasonable foundation.
Id. at 350-51.
63. Id. at 152-53.
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The second and related problem is that the principle of Truitt is
easy to state but difficult to apply, and for more than two decades
the Board and the courts have given the principle a restricted
meaning. Admittedly influenced by dubious case law developed by
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,64 the Board has held
that the employer's position-that it cannot grant increases because
to do so would place it at a competitive disadvantage-is not a claim
of an inability to pay. And in recent years the Board has said:
[W]e note that the phrase "inability to pay" means, by
definition, that the employer is incapable of meeting the
union's demands. That is, the phrase means more than the
assertion that it would be difficult to pay, or that it would
cause economic problems or distress to pay. 'Inability to
pay' means that the company presently has insufficient
assets to pay or that it would have insufficient assets to pay
during the life of the contract that is being negotiated. Thus,
inability to pay is inextricably linked to nonsurvival in
business.6
5
Accordingly, these two areas of the law have circumscribed
robust and authentic negotiations and, thus, have not served the
collective bargaining process well and have played a major role in
producing the phenomena observed by Ferguson and Kochan. Yet,
EFCA itself is not only badly out of sync with the period of time
provided to negotiate a first contract under the Proposed Bill, but it
also fails to take into account the complexity and length of the
interest arbitration process itself.66 Experience to date in the public
sector indicates that these cases can take some time. Amongst the
interest arbitrations that I have done was one between the Detroit
School Board and the Federation of Teachers twenty years ago
where hearings continued day and night for a week, detailed briefs
were filed thereafter, and the arbitration board was required to
meet and decide on the basis of voluminous submissions at the end
of it all.67 Though we cannot tolerate delays such as the fifteen
months that apparently exist in the public sector in Michigan,
framers of the law must realize that it will take considerable time
and expense.
64. E.g., Nielsen Lithographing Co. v. NLRB, 854 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1988).
65. AMF Trucking & Warehousing, Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 1125, 1126 (2004).
66. See Shikha Dalmia, Op-Ed., The 'Free Choice' Act and Binding
Arbitration, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2009, at All; Paul Kersey, Card Check,
Binding Arbitration and Employee Free Choice: The Arbitration Gamble, Feb.
27, 2007, http://www.mackinac.org/article.aspx?ID=8326.
67. Sch. Bd. of Detroit v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers, 93 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 648 (1989) (Gould, Arb.).
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Even more important, EFCA is also flawed because it does not
provide well for a necessary uncertainty about (1) the period of
time that will pass before arbitration is invoked and also (2) the
terms on which it will be available. If there is a time certain at
which interest arbitration can be invoked, parties will simply
maneuver in anticipation of the process and focus less upon the
genuine task of voluntary collective bargaining. Moreover, the
prospect of arbitration (particularly at a time certain) will
frequently produce rigidity in the collective bargaining process
because both sides will adopt relatively extreme positions, hoping
that the third-party impartial arbitrator will split the difference in
its favor.
The first problem can be addressed by providing uncertainty,
albeit within the constraints of producing a collective bargaining
agreement-in most instances through voluntary negotiation-that
takes form at least within the certification year so that an incumbent
union's representative status is not rendered vulnerable.68 The
Canadian provinces have generally imposed a "screen" as a barrier
to be surmounted before the process is available. Some finding must
be made by a mediator or an administrative agency that the parties
are at impasse, that bargaining is not productive, or that there has
been a pattern of conduct that obstructs collective bargaining
thereby rendering it dysfunctional. 69 Generally, the focus will be
upon the employer, but the union, if it believes that it can obtain
arbitration on terms more favorable than bargaining can render, may
itself be responsible for the roadblocks. One way to reduce this
potential problem is to diminish the incentive to arbitrate by
providing that the award cannot replicate the union-negotiated rate
in the industry or geographical area-or that it cannot mirror such a
contract where the arbitrator or the institution (which plays a
screening role) finds that the union bears some responsibility for the
68. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954). Once a collective bargaining
agreement is negotiated-EFCA provides for an award of a contract with a
duration of two years-the contract acts as a bar to a further challenge. General
Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1962), set the maximum time for such a bar at
three years. The Board has refused to extend the period in which a contract acts
as a bar to a representation petition from three to four years despite my
contention that there has been a significant increase in the number of paper
industry contracts with a duration of at least four years. Dobbs Int'l Servs., Inc.,
323 N.L.R.B. 1159, 1159 (1997) (Chairman Gould, dissenting). American
Seating Corp., 106 N.L.R.B. 250 (1953), had set the bar at the lesser period of
the agreement and set a permitted maximum period (then two years).
69. GOULD, AGENDA FOR REFORM, supra note 28, at 327-28. For general
discussion, see Susan Johnson, First Contract Arbitration: Effects on
Bargaining and Work Stoppages, (Jan. 2008) (paper presented at the Labor and
Employment Relations Association, on file with the author).
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bargaining breakdown. The latter consideration reflects a quasi-no-
fault approach that has been accepted in Japan, but not the United
States.7u The objective must be to make arbitration rare and
collective bargaining the rule.
The second problem also relates to the bargaining process. If
parties believe that the arbitrator will split the difference then there
will be no incentive to compromise, an ingredient that is a
prerequisite to reaching an agreement voluntarily. Here, the answer
may be baseball arbitration or a variation on this theme. Baseball
arbitration, adopted in a number of state jurisdictions, is so-called
"final offer" arbitration where the parties must submit their final
offers, and the arbitrator must select from one of the two. This
approach has been incorporated in a number of public sector
statutes that provide for interest arbitration in classifications where
the strike cannot be tolerated, basically police, fire,71 and
70. WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, JAPAN'S RESHAPING OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW
89-93 (1984) (Japanese NLRB providing for conditional relief where both
parties have misbehaved).
71. See ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.070(b) (2006) (compulsory arbitration for
police, fire, correctional facility, and hospital employees); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 5-276a(e), 7-473c (West 2007 & Supp. 2008) (binding, item-by-item
final-offer arbitration available at either party's request after statutory period of
negotiation for all state employees; mandatory after statutory period of
negotiation for municipal employees); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1614-1615
(2006) (binding, total-package final-offer arbitration available at either party's
request or the mediator's recommendation for police and fire employees); D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 1-617.02, .17 (2009) (compulsory binding, total-package final-
offer arbitration after statutory negotiation period for all Washington D.C.
employees when compensation is at issue; a variety of mechanisms are available
in other cases); HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 89-11 (LexisNexis 2007) (compulsory
binding arbitration for most state employees-including police and fire-after
statutory negotiation period is the default rule; parties may stipulate their own
impasse procedures that end in arbitration); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 315/14
(2005 & Supp.) (binding, item-by-item final-offer arbitration at either party's
request after statutory period of negotiation for security employees, peace
officers, and firefighters); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 20.22, 679B. 15-.27 (West 2009)
(binding, item-by-item final-offer arbitration available at either party's request
after statutory negotiation process for most public employees, including police;
bargaining on behalf of firefighters in towns larger than 10,000 is probably
governed by § 679B, which does not provide for binding arbitration); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 965 (2007 & Supp. 2008) (compulsory binding arbitration
on issues other than salary, pension, and insurance after statutory negotiation
process for public employees including police and fire employees; parties may
agree to binding arbitration on those issues as well); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 423.231-247 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008) (compulsory binding item-by-item
final-offer arbitration for police and fire employees); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
179A.16 (West 2006 & Supp. 2008) (binding final-offer arbitration at the
request of either party for "essential employees," a designation which includes
police and fire employees; the parties may choose item-by-item or total-
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sometimes teachers in public education.7 2 There is no scope for
compromise inasmuch as the arbitrator must select one or the
other, thereby inducing the parties to become reasonable in the
final position that they put forward in the hope that the arbitrator
will select theirs as the best one. This appears to have worked very
well in baseball salary disputes (I was involved in some of them in
1992-93), but of course the difference between salary arbitration
and the collective bargaining process is that in baseball salaries
package); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-31-503-505, 39-34-101-103 (2007)
(binding total-package final-offer arbitration available at the request of either
party for police and fire employees); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:13A-14-16 (West
2000 & Supp. 2008) (compulsory arbitration after statutory negotiation process
for police and fire employees; parties may chose the type of arbitration by
agreement); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-7E- 18 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008) (binding,
total-package final-offer arbitration available at either party's request after
statutory negotiation period for public employees); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§
51-101-113 (West 1994 and Supp. 2009) (binding, total-package final-offer
arbitration available at either party's request after statutory negotiation period
for police and fire employees); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 243.742 (West 2003 &
Supp. 2008) (compulsory binding arbitration for public employees prohibited
from striking, including police and fire); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 217. 1-.10
(West 1992 & Supp. 2008) (binding arbitration at request of either party after
statutory negotiation period for police and fire); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-9.1-1-16,
28-9.2-1-16 (2006 & Supp. 2008) (compulsory binding arbitration after
statutory negotiation period for police and fire employees); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 1733 (West 2007) (compulsory binding arbitration after statutory
negotiation process for police and fire employees); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
41.56.450 (West 2006) (binding arbitration after statutory negotiation process
for "uniformed personnel," which includes police and fire employees); WIS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 111.70, .77 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008) (compulsory binding
total-package final-offer arbitration after statutory negotiation process for police
and fire employees).
72. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, §§ 4014-4015 (binding, total-package
final-offer arbitration available at either party's request or the mediator's
recommendation for public school employees); D.C. CODE. §§ 1-617.02, .17
(2006) (compulsory binding, total-package final-offer arbitration after statutory
negotiation period for all Washington D.C. employees when compensation is at
issue; a variety of mechanisms are available in other cases); IOWA CODE ANN. §
20.22 (West 2001) (binding, item-by-item final-offer arbitration available at
either party's request after statutory negotiation process for most public
employees including teachers); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 965 (2007 &
Supp. 2008) (compulsory binding arbitration on issues other than salary,
pension, and insurance after statutory negotiation process for public employees,
including teachers; parties may agree to binding arbitration on those issues as
well); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-7E-18 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008) (binding, total-
package final-offer arbitration available at either party's request after statutory
negotiation period for public employees); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-9.3-1-16
(2006) (arbitration available at either party's request; the decision is binding on
all issues "not involving the expenditure of money").
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there is simply one issue, i.e., the salary, and the arbitrator is
authorized to only write in one or the other proposal to the
individual contract of employment.
In collective bargaining there are many issues, and the process
is more complicated as a result of this fact. But if the arbitrator
selects a series of proposals item by item much of the purpose of
final offer arbitration will be undermined because the parties may
take unreasonable positions on the items that they do not need to
have adopted or are less serious about in the hope that the
arbitrator will be inclined to split the difference in their favor by
adopting their position on the contract clauses that are important to
them where they adopt reasonable positions. In other words, item-
by-item final offer arbitration lends itself to adoption of the very
tactics that the process is designed to combat. On the other hand, if
the arbitrator is restricted to selecting from an entire package put
forward by either side-a position that seems preferable to an
item-by-item approach-the potential for providing an award that
includes some unsuitable positions increases. This is particularly
so when there are a large number of issues in dispute, a
phenomenon ever more likely in first contract negotiations and
arbitration. Intrinsically, interest arbitration is difficult enough
because this process involves issues made more difficult by virtue
of the fact that the arbitrator is legislating for the parties rather than
operating under the standards that the parties (always infinitely
more expert than the arbitrator himself) have provided.
One approach, designed to take into account the need to get the
parties to adopt a series of positions on an entire package and at the
same time recognizing the perils involved in it, would be to allow
the third party to make recommendations as a fact-finder does
under some public employee labor statutes.73 Then the statute
could explicitly permit the parties to negotiate for a limited period
of time, e.g., ten to fourteen days subsequent to the
recommendation. The parties, upon completion of their bargaining
and perhaps with the assistance of the third party who can act as a
mediator, may then propose modifications to the initial set of
recommendations in the event that they are unable to resolve their
differences within the time period established. The arbitrator, at
this point operating within a framework that presumes that his
award is the appropriate one to impose, would render an award that
nonetheless takes into account the subsequent bargaining and
73. See generally William B. Gould, Public Employment: Mediation, Fact
Finding andArbitration, 55 A.B.A. J. 835 (1969).
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positions of the parties.74 Perhaps in most instances under these
circumstances it would not be necessary to come back to the third
party, with labor and management resolving their differences on
their own initiative. But, in any event, the third-party arbitrator,
having seen the parties close up as a mediator subsequent to his or
her initial recommendations, would have a better sense of what is
practicable in light of subsequent negotiations and proposals.
IV. REMEDIES, SANCTIONS, AND INJUNCTION PROCEDURES
In this arena, now more than ever, the overriding theme is
delay in the administrative process. Delay makes the awards of
back pay and reinstatement to workers discriminatorily dismissed
in union organizational campaigns by the Board a "license fee"
that the employer must pay, which is considerably more
inexpensive than negotiating a collective bargaining agreement
with the union. The cost of increased wages and fringe benefits
will be in excess of any back pay award provided to unlawfully
dismissed workers. Moreover, the problem is exacerbated because
of the considerable delay in the administrative and judicial process
when workers have "scattered to the winds," and, even if they can
be located, may have lost interest in the union organizational
activity because of the absence of any collective bargaining
process and the failure to change employment conditions, which
are frozen until the union activity is resolved. Dismissed workers
may not avail themselves of reinstatement under these
circumstances and may not even seek back pay when faced with
the prospect of future litigation to determine whether the amount in
controversy is diminished by interim earnings or that which could
have been obtained through reasonable diligence-and the burden
of proof to show mitigation that the Bush II Board has thrust upon
the General Counsel to prove entitlement.
75
This problem is compounded by the fact that a union, whose
organizational activities have triggered discriminatory conduct
engaged in by the employer, gets a satisfactory remedy only when
it speaks to the collective interest, i.e., the imposition of
recognition on the basis of authorization cards where employer
misconduct contaminates the electoral process and thus makes the
secret ballot box election an ineffective test of employee free
choice. The Board-and particularly the circuit courts of
74. This suggestion is inspired by and akin to ideas propounded by Professor
Goldberg in Stephen B. Goldberg, A Modest Proposal for Better Integrating
Collective Bargaining and Interest Arbitration, 19 LAB. LAW. 97 (2003).
75. See St. George Warehouse, 351 N.L.R.B. 961 (2007).
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appealsV6-have circumscribed this remedy, which emerges only
subsequent to convoluted unfair labor practice proceedings before
an administrative law judge, the Board, and ultimately the circuit
courts themselves through which delay is extended and union
support consequently dissipated. Finally, other forms of
compensatory remedies for the union are relatively
insignificant "-for it is only through collective bargaining that the
union can establish itself and that freedom of association can be
respected.
What are the best answers to this problem? In the first place,
EFCA is right to enhance the Board's authority to obtain injunctive
relief in employer unfair labor practice cases arising in union
organizational campaigns or first contract negotiations.78 The
statute as presently written mandates the Board, through its
regional officials, to obtain injunctive relief against certain union
unfair labor practices in an expeditious fashion. 79 On the other
hand, injunctions against employer unfair labor practices are
treated in a fairly cumbersome manner. Here, the question of
whether injunctive relief can be obtained is within the Board's
discretion-and the matter must go to the Board in Washington,
D.C., after its investigation at the regional level. 80 Thus, EFCA is
right to fashion some measure of symmetry between injunctions
against employer and union unfair labor practices. But because
76. See cases cited supra note 32.
77. See, e.g., Tiidee Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 502 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(refusing to award litigation expenses even while upholding sanctions for a
"clear and flagrant" violation), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975); Hecks, Inc.,
215 N.L.R.B. 765 (1974) (refusing, on remand from the Supreme Court, to
award litigation expenses where the court of appeals in the earlier proceeding-
reversed by the Court-had awarded them). But see NLRB v. Unbelievable,
Inc., 71 F.3d 1434 (9th Cir. 1995) (sanctioning an employer and its counsel for
filing a frivolous appeal by ordering them to pay attorneys' fees and double
costs).
78. Employee Free Choice Act of 2007, H.R. 800, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007).
This provision of EFCA would extend the expedited injunction process to any
employer interference with the rights of employees set forth in Section 7 of the
NLRA.
79. At present, in response to many types of unfair labor practice
complaints against a union, "the preliminary investigation of such charge shall
be made forthwith and given priority over all other cases except cases of like
character in the office where it is filed or to which it is referred." 29 U.S.C. §
160(1) (2006).
80. In response to other types of unfair labor practice complaints-
including virtually all that can be filed against an employer-"[t]he Board
[merely] shall have power . . . to petition any [jurisdictionally appropriate]
United States district court . . . for appropriate temporary relief or restraining
order." 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (2006).
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these injunctions against employers are extraordinarily labor-
intensive, they will necessitate an outlay of expenditures and
appropriations by Congress far beyond anything anticipated at
present. This means that injunctions, however important they have
been in the Board's history prior to any amendments, will probably
assume a role that is secondary to the actual sanctions that can be
imposed against such conduct.
The approach of EFCA on sanctions, i.e., to award triple back
pay, seems to be one that provides a good deterrent for statutory
violations-or at least a deterrent that is much superior to that
which exists under the law today. This should reduce the "license
fee" phenomenon and make the remedies more of a deterrent.
8
'
The deterrent may be even more considerable in connection
with another feature of EFCA, i.e., the provision of up to $20,000
fines that may be imposed for each violation. This kind of
approach is long overdue and should have been available to the
Board in the past when the Supreme Court declared that
undocumented workers, while employees within the meaning of
the Act and thus entitled to its protection,8 2 could not obtain back
pay relief 8 3 Fines would have been a more than adequate surrogate
for back pay awards, especially given the difficulties in finding
such workers who fear deportation as the result of employer
retaliation and who are afraid to come forward and protest in any
event.
84
But there are other aspects of the delay issue that have not
obtained the attention of EFCA's authors and that should. The first
is that the problem of delay in the all-important representation
cases remains a significant one because of the fact that employers
can litigate disputed issues in representation proceedings after they
have lost before the Board by simply refusing to bargain, thus
raising the very same issues through the unfair labor practice
machinery that have already been resolved in representation
matters. An amended statute should make the Board the final
81. But the mitigation principle contained in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB,
313 U.S. 177 (1941), which EFCA presumably leaves intact, will diminish and
delay any award. (I am indebted to one of my research assistants, Mike Scanlon,
for reminding me of this point.)
82. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891-92 (1984).
83. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
84. Even Congressman Tom Campbell (now a leading candidate for
Governor of California), who objected to my board's (later abrogated) decision
in A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 408 (1995) (authorizing
back pay for undocumented workers), abrogated by Hoffman, 535 U.S. 137, was
willing to establish fines in lieu of back pay awards. WILLIAM B. GOULD IV,
LABORED RELATIONS: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE NLRB-A MEMOIR 210-11
(2000) [hereinafter GOULD, LABORED RELATIONS].
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arbiter of these disputes and preclude appeals to the courts
thereafter. 85 The initial objective in the Act was to provide an
expeditious avenue for the resolution of representation cases
because they needed special and prompt attention, but this goal has
been substantially circumvented through the availability of unfair
labor practice cases. 86 The Board has attempted to address this
with summary proceedings through which relitigation of
representation issues is dealt with on the fast track. But after the
fast track is completed, the courts are still available, and Congress,
as part of any amendments to the Act, should deny this avenue so
that the statute works more effectively.
V. LAW REFORM PROPOSALS ON NLRB APPOINTMENTS
A second aspect of delay that has not received attention from
EFCA relates to the appointments process. This matter has created
difficulty in the past two to three decades as there has been
considerably more polarization between labor and management
and Democrats and Republicans. 87 Said Colby College Professor
G. Calvin Mackenzie:
What is most distressing ultimately is the transcendent
loss of purpose in the appointment process. The American
model did not always work perfectly, but it was informed
by a grand notion. The business of the people would be
managed by leaders drawn from the people. Cincinnatus,
in-and-outers, non-career managers-with every election
would come a new sweep of the country for high energy
and new ideas and fresh visions. The [P]resident's team
would assume its place and impose the people's wishes on
the great agencies of government. Not infrequently, it
actually worked that way.
But these days, the model fails on nearly all counts. Most
appointees do not come from the countryside, brimming
with new energy and ideas. Much more often they come
from congressional staffs or think tanks or interest
groups-not from across the country but from across the
85. But see Rodney Smolla, Is Paulson's Bailout Constitutional?, SLATE,
Sept. 24, 2008, http://www.slate.com/id/2200817/pagenum/all/.
86. See generally AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940).
87. GOULD, LABORED RELATIONS, supra note 84, at 19-21.
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street: interchangeable public elites, engaged in an insider's
game.
88
As Professor Mackenzie has noted, the appointments made to
the Board in the past few decades have been disproportionately
"inside the Beltway" appointments where connections on Capitol
Hill and with lobbying organizations are valued more than
previously obtained expertise in the field of labor-management
relations and the law. Proceeding alongside this phenomenon has
been the recently devised so-called "batching" method of
appointment through which a package of nominees is confirmed
together, which both labor and management and Democrats and
Republicans can support.
89
Until 1994, when I was confirmed as Chairman and two other
Board Members and the General Counsel were simultaneously
appointed and confirmed due to Senator Nancy Kassebaum's
opposition to me, there had been no batching of confirmations in
fifty-one years after the Taft-Hartley amendments increased the
number of Board members from three to five, therefore
necessitating the simultaneous appointment of a Democrat and
Republican in 1947. For the past fifteen years, i.e., during the
Clinton and Bush II administrations, both Democratic and
Republican Congresses have followed the Kassebaum approach.
Regrettably, the Obama Administration-which campaigned on a
platform of "change"-appears to adhere to the new status quo of
"batching.
90
88. E-mail from Professor G. Calvin Mackenzie, Goldfarb Family
Distinguished Professor of Government, Colby College to Author (Dec. 28,
2006, 9:59 EST) (on file with author); G. Calvin Mackenzie, Starting Over: The
Presidential Appointment Process in 1997, at 39-40 (1998).
89. This "batching" is associated with a polarization both between labor and
management as well as between Democrats and Republicans, which has lead to
a two-member Board in 2008 and 2009. On the question of whether such a
Board is lawfully constituted, see Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v.
NLRB, 564 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed, (Sept. 29, 2009)
(No. 09-377); New Process Steel, LP v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2009),
petition for cert. filed, (May 22, 2009) No. 08-1457); Snell Island SNF, LLC v.
NLRB, 568 F.3d 410 (2d Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed, (Sept. 11, 2009)
(No. 09-328); Ne. Land Servs., Ltd. v. NLRB, 560 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2009),
petition for cert. filed, (Aug. 18, 2009) (No. 09-213). In my view, the opinion of
Judge Cabranes in Snell Island is the most well-reasoned one, reflecting the
policies of the Act.
90. Acorn's Ally at the NLRB: Obama appoints an SEIU man with ties to
Blago, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2009, at A16 ("The NLRB has both GOP and
Democrat members, and nominees are typically packaged together to avoid
hearings.")
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This policy should be abandoned. For, again, Professor
Mackenzie has described this process well:
The tendency to select appointees to an agency as teams
and to divide up control over the choices has become the
norm in Washington. The Senate, in fact, often delays
confirmation until several nominations to the same agency
accumulate, thus allowing it to require that the President
include some nominees who are effectively designated by
powerful Senators. This kind of batching of nominations
rarely happened before the present date. Even on the
regulatory commissions, whose original statutes require
that only a bare majority of appointees can be from one
party, a vacancy in an opposition party chair was usually
filled by the President with an enrollee in the opposition
party who supported the President. These appointments,
common for most of this century, came to be known as
"friendly Indians" and were routinely confirmed by the
Senate even when it was controlled by the opposition party.
But they allowed the incumbent President to control the
appointment process and to shape the majorities on most
regulatory commissions.
That is nearly impossible these days. The membership of
the regulatory commissions has become little more than the
sum of the set of disjointed political calculations. Concerns
about fealty to leadership, effective teamwork, and
intellectual or ideological coherence play almost no part in
the selection of regulatory commissioners. The juggling of
political interests dominates. That we as a nation often get
inconsistent and incoherent regulatory policies should be
no surprise to those that follow the shuffling and dealing
that produces regulatory commissioners.
An additional complicating factor in "batching" is that the
Republicans do not have the same incentive to make a deal
regarding a group of nominees for a particular agency. This
is especially so of an agency like the National Labor
Relations Board which operates under statutory principles
in which a large number of Republicans do not believe.
Accordingly ... all of the incentives are weighted toward
crippling the agency.91
This phenomenon is directly linked to the delay in Washington,
where the statutory loopholes exploited by employers have dilated
91. E-mail from Professor G. Calvin Mackenzie, supra note 88;
MACKENZIE, supra note 88.
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into a "black hole" of administrative delay into which cases
descend-particularly when they reach the Board in Washington.
There are, after all, time limits established by the Board for
administrative law judges and Regional Directors who handle
cases as they arise throughout the region.9 2 There are none for the
Board operating in Washington, D.C., though I unsuccessfully
advocated such a reform when I was Chairman-as well as other
reforms that would have the effect of producing cases even though
the Board Members wanted more to write subsequent to the
issuance of the majority opinion. 93 As much as any other factor,
the decline in case production and increase in delay during the last
years of the Clinton Board and the Bush II Board had to do with
reticence by Board Members to decide cases because a decision
may have exposed the Board Member to congressional hostility,
which would have interfered with reappointment prospects at the
end of what is usually a five-year term. 94 As I have written
elsewhere, only when I belatedly and reluctantly began to speak
out on this issue did Congress seek the identity of recalcitrant
Board Members. Only when I provided members of Congress with
permission to make direct telephone calls to the offending
individuals were the cases in question actually disgorged. 95 They
could have been released many months, if not years, in advance of
this painful process.
Production has continued to decline even more so in this
century, notwithstanding the fact that the caseload itself has
diminished in the wake of disillusionment with the Board. Even
though President Obama has appointed two outstanding union
lawyers as the Democratic nominees, the Obama administration
has bought into the idea so roundly condemned by Professor
Mackenzie that it is required by this fifteen-year tradition to only
appoint Republican members that have the imprimatur of the
Republican congressional leadership-even though this policy
emerged in the Clinton era when President Clinton had no choice
because of the control of Congress by the opposition party. This
adherence to the package concept means delay in the appointments
and in the future course of an Obama Board, which had no
confirmation hearings scheduled as of late-2009 because of the
failure of the Republicans to come forward with someone
92. GOULD, LABORED RELATIONS, supra note 84, at 61.
93. Id. at 61-62.
94. Cf William B. Gould IV, Should the National Labor Relations Act Be
Retired?: The NLRB at Age 70: Some Reflections on the Clinton Board and the
Bush IIAfternath, 26 BERKELEY J. EMp. & LAB. L. 309 (2005).
95. Id. at 280-86.
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acceptable to them and the President! 96 Now that a Republican has
been "batched" with the Democratic nominees appointed by
President Obama, the Republican nominee turns out to be the
Republican Labor Policy Director in the Senate Labor
Committee.97 Professor Mackenzie's criticisms remain valid in
2009, 2010 and beyond. Institutional memory seems to stop at the
fifteen-year-old water's edge.
Abandonment of this policy that has eroded the effectiveness
and mission of the Board would have been a good first step by the
Obama Administration. But it has moved down a different course.
Similarly, reduction in the Board membership from five to three
would make the Board more focused and reduce the potential for
"holds" by incumbent Board Members who, without explanation,
will not produce decisions. This remains true even if the statute,
through revised recognition procedures as well as interest
arbitration, becomes more complicated and the caseload is
increased at the same time. But even more importantly, I am of the
view that statutory amendments relating to the term of office and
prospects for reappointment or lack thereof will be most likely to
improve Board standards.
There have been too many cases, such as Goya Foods of
Florida,98 that have languished at the Board for almost a decade
because of a lethargic unwillingness of the Board to move. I have
long advocated a bar against reappointment to the Board, which
would reduce the incentive to maneuver in anticipation of adverse
congressional reactions. If reappointment was denied by statute,
the appointee would know that there is nothing that he or she could
do to extend their Washington service at the Board, even though
they might want to extend it elsewhere in another government
institution. However, it must be admitted that Washington is
inherently dysfunctional and that this reform might well simply
turn the attention of Board incumbents to other federal positions.
At the same time, I am of the view that the term of office
should be extended to eight years so that the public gains from the
acquired expertise and the inevitable turnover produced by an
inability to reappoint does not interfere with the Board's
efficiency. All of this, it seems to me, will go some way towards
depoliticization of the Board, break the appointment of
96. Love of Labour: Unions are winning again in Washington, but the big
fights are still ahead, THE ECoNOMIST, Oct. 31, 2009, at 36.
97. White House Announces Three NLRB Nominations, N.L.R.B. Bulletin
(Nat'l Labor Relations Bd.), July 10, 2009; William B. Gould IV, What Would
Employee Free Choice Mean in the Workplace?, supra note 27.
98. 347 N.L.R.B. 1118 (2006).
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Washington insiders described by Professor Mackenzie that
continues onward through the present, and induce service on the
part of a geographically diverse group of the best people who are
willing to serve for the very best reasons. As I have previously
written, the Board needs those, like Cincinnatus, who will depart at
the end of the day rather than cling to the trappings of office in
Washington. If a variety of measures, including an attack upon the
"black hole" phenomenon of inertia in Washington itself, are
undertaken, the Board's credibility in the circuit courts will
inevitably improve, regardless of the panel of reviewing judges.
Congress could have then, and should now, enact time limits
requirin the Board to issue decisions within three to four
months. It could follow the example of California, which requires
its agencies (1) to decide whether to take action on an
administrative law judge's proposed decision within 100 days of
its receipt and (2) to issue its final decision within 100 days of
this. 00 There is no earthly reason why the NLRB cannot meet
these standards, and they should be part of labor law reform. This
would avoid the growing embarrassment to which the Board has
subjected itself.'1 The growing perception is well reflected in the
comments of Judge John Henry Noonan of the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit:
No decisionmaking body is totally immune from the
dilatory virus, and delay is sometimes the too human way
of grappling with the thorny issue of policy. Nonetheless,
the Board stands out as a federal administrative agency
which has been rebuked before for what must strike anyone
as a cavalier disdain for the hardship it is causing .... We
call [the doctrine that extraordinary delay is grounds for
refusing to enforce an administrative order] to the Board's
99. For a general discussion of time limits, see Jacob E. Gersen & Anne
Joseph O'Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 923
(2008).
100. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11517(c)(2), (c)(E)(iv) (West 2005 & Supp. 2009).
(I am grateful to Professor Michael Asimow for bringing this to my attention.)
Similarly, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act contains a provision allowing a
whistleblower to bring a private action at law or equity for de novo review in a
federal district court if the Secretary of Labor does not issue a final decision on a
complaint within 180 days of its filing. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(B) (2006). (I
am grateful to Mike Scanlon for bringing this to my attention.).
101. In one case, a writ of mandamus was successfully sought and obtained
from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia requiring the NLRB to
issue a decision that was pending with the court for seventeen years, within only
a twelve-day time period. See In re Pirlott, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 1352 (D.C.
Cir. Jan. 18, 2007). The NLRB obeyed. Scheiber Foods, 349 N.L.R.B. 77
(2007).
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attention as a reminder that, whatever its internal problems,
the Board has a duty to act promptly in the discharge of its
important functions. 
02
VI. THE PROMOTION OF VOLUNTARY INITIATIVES
An amended NLRA ought to promote voluntary initiatives to
resolve many of the issues that come before the Board at present.
Regrettably, the Bush II Board has done exactly the opposite by
discouraging and, one might say, precluding voluntary recognition
procedures without the authorization of the Board.10 At the same
time, as Professor Laura Cooper has written,' 0 4 the Board's
processes are substantially superior to those that are the subject of
private negotiation.105 In part, this is a matter of institutional
resources-an arbitrator resolving recognition issues usually does
so alone without any staff, independent or otherwise. Whatever
finally emerges in EFCA or in another statute that serves the same
basic purpose, it is clear that the Board can do a better job
resolving card check procedures and disputes about secret ballot
box elections than private parties when it comes to issues such as
the unit, eligibility to vote, and disputes about the cards (if that is
what the basis for recognition is). As noted above, in some
instances it seems to me that the statute itself can address the
problem of delays in representation matters through expeditious
elections, injunctions, and sanctions, as well as by the denial of
appeals.
But disputes arising out of union organizing complaints could
be handled by the parties themselves through appointment of an
impartial third party to either issue recommendations or binding
decisions. What is particularly important here is that "[t]he path to
systemic reform ...probably lies not only in easing agency
workloads and increasing their resources, but also in recognizing
that trial-type procedures are not necessarily the best or only fair
means of reaching administrative decisions.06 It is unlikely that
Congress will legislate procedures that preclude provisions for
102. NLRB v. Ancor Concepts, Inc., 166 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 1999).
103. See Dana Corp., 351 N.L.RB. 434 (2007).
104. Laura J. Cooper, Privatizing Labor Law: Neutrality/Card Check
Agreements and the Role of the Arbitrator, 83 IND. L.J. 1589 (2008).
105. For an arbitration award providing for comprehensive and substantial
damage remedies under a voluntary agreement, see Yale-New Haven Hospital &
New Eng. Health Care Employers, Dist. 1199, SEIU (Oct. 23, 2007) (Kern,
Arb.), available at http://www.ynhhunion.org/newsletter/arbitration-080.pdf.
106. George A. Bermann, Administrative Delay and Its Control, 30 AM. J.
Comp. L. SuPP. 473, 474 (1982).
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hearings-at least it is unlikely in 2009. But Congress can
encourage the parties to do it for themselves!
And the roadmap is available. This is the approach, i.e.,
investigations without hearings, undertaken by FirstGroup, a major
British multinational with 110,000 employees in the United States
and Canada.' 0 7 In so doing, it has relied upon the Board to resolve
recognition itself through the secret ballot box election, thus
avoiding some of the problems identified by Professor Cooper but
at the same time establishing an independent monitor
mechanism'0 8 to resolve freedom of association complaints arising
out of union organizational efforts. The Freedom of Association
(FOA) policies were derived from the company's social
responsibility policy and explicitly state that its protection for
employees is not only rooted in international law, but also is
stronger than those in the NLRA-though employees and union
organizers may always file a charge with the NLRB at any point.
The process does not provide for a hearing but rather an
investigation conducted by the independent monitor staff with
public recommendations to the company and complaining party
within thirty to sixty days subsequent to the filing of the complaint.
The company has an additional thirty days to respond to the
recommendations and, in a substantial majority of the cases, has
accepted the recommendations.
The advantages to this process are obvious. The first is the
remarkable speed within which complaints are processed, and,
while the independent monitor does not possess affidavits or the
authority to issue subpoenas, the company and the relevant unions
have thus far complied with the inquiries of a neutral party who, in
contrast to an arbitrator in card check cases, has an investigative
staff. Thus, the discovery problem alluded to above is overridden.
Additionally, in contrast to the NLRA-which is the only modem
employment statute that is not posted in company facilities-
extensive publicity about freedom of association rights and
procedures is provided through enclosed bulletin boards with
complaint forms and related FOA information, as well as a DVD
for the company's 110,000 employees.
This approach is in some respects similar to the settlement
judge process created during my chairmanship at the Board when
administrative law judges attempted to resolve unfair labor practice
charges without the need for further litigation and with both sides
107. See Gould, Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, supra note 28.
108. 1 have served in this capacity since January 1, 2008. George Raine,
Veteran Labor Lawyer Takes on New Challenge, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 26, 2008, at
Cl.
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free to pursue the available statutory avenues if the effort was
unsuccessful. It seems to me that making this option available in
the first instance could similarly resolve these issues within a
matter of weeks or months, in sharp contrast to the years of NLRB
litigation that are so frequent. If the controversy culminates in a
formal opinion, such as the kind of recommendations that are
provided for in the FirstGroup machinery, it is possible that written
recommendations could be taken into account where one party
accepts them and the other does not-perhaps in some measure
akin to arbitration decisions. 10 9 The FirstGroup policy, as well as
other voluntarily devised procedures, requires that the employer
not engage in anti-union speech, whether it be of the coercive or
non-coercive variety-and captive audience speeches that
employees are compelled to attend in order to listen to the
employer's message are prohibited as well. Anything that
emanates from the employer and is derisive of the union is
prohibited.
These approaches do not need to be replicated in toto in order
to find statutory favor. But it seems to me that the new
amendments to the Act ought to promote adherence to such
policies in the interest of both speed and voluntary dispute
resolution. They allow a laboratory to develop, which might
ultimately influence NLRA provisions as well. If the new
procedures work well, Congress could consider the abbreviation or
elimination of full-fledged hearings under some circumstances.
VII. JURISDICTION OVER SMALL EMPLOYERS
Section 14(c)(2) of the Landrum-Griffin amendments enacted
in 1959 were a direct response to the Eisenhower Board's states'
rights positions through which it vacated jurisdiction over
particular industries that it deemed to be local in nature or
appropriate to state resolution-where, in its view, the amount of
109. The appropriate NLRB deference is contained in Spielberg Mfg. Co.,
112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955) (deference to arbitration decisions), and Collyer
Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971) (deference for arbitration decisions);
see also Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing, U.S., Inc., 325 N.L.R.B. 176, 180
(1997) (Chairman Gould, concurring) ("In order to obtain deference under the
statute, arbitrators should consider, and be competent to consider, the unfair
labor practice controversy which would otherwise be adjudicated by this
Agency. In this respect, some of the same policy considerations mandated by the
Supreme Court in employment discrimination and individual employment
contract litigation are applicable to the National Labor Relations Act."). The
same standards have been applied to joint union-employer committees. Hines v.
Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976); Gen. Drivers Local Union No.
89 v. Riss & Co. 372 U.S. 517 (1963).
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business done in interstate commerce was simply too small for
federal government involvement. Out of this policy came the "no
man's land" created as the result of Supreme Court decisions that
precluded the exercise of state jurisdiction over subject matter that
the Supreme Court found that Congress had deemed to be within
the realm of federal regulatory authority and thus preempted.'" °
Again, section 14(c)(2) was designed to reverse the Eisenhower
Board's policy of states' rights in that it froze the jurisdictional
yardsticks of the Board and consequently precluded the agency
from declining jurisdiction over more than it was declining at the
time of the 1959 amendments.
But the problem here, a half-century later, is that inflation has
changed dollar values so that the effect of the jurisdictional
yardsticks involves the Board in regulation of employers much
smaller than those within Congress' contemplation in 1959. In the
1990s, the Republican Congress urged my Board to revise the
guidelines, but I pointed out to them that this process could only be
undertaken by Congress itself."' My views were not always well
110. See Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
111. During my time as Chairman, I had the following exchange with
Representative Porter while testifying at a hearing before the Appropriations
Committee:
[Mr. Porter:] Let me tell you that I'm also very concerned about the
proposed NLRB rule on single bargaining units. I frankly do not
understand why an agency with a caseload like yours would want to go
to a rule at all. It seems crazy, frankly. I know that probably Mr.
Bonilla has already discussed it with you. I understand that you
generally justify the rulemaking in terms of increasing efficiency and
reducing litigation. But let me suggest to you perhaps a more
reasonable, fair, and effective way of reducing your caseload. In 1959,
the NLRB established jurisdictional thresholds to screen out cases with
very small economic impact. The dollar amounts of these thresholds
have not been updated for inflation in almost 40 years. I suggest that
you update the thresholds. As an example, in 1959 the NLRB declined
jurisdiction over any non-retail business with less than $50,000 in
interstate commerce. Adjusted for inflation, that $50,000 is now
$262,000. Just as the Board declined jurisdiction for businesses under
$50,000 in 1959, so it should now decline jurisdiction for any business
less than $262,000.
Can you tell us for the record for each year 1990 to 1995 how many
cases over which the NLRB exercised jurisdiction would not have
merited NLRB consideration if the thresholds had been updated to the
Consumer Price Index?
Mr. Gould: Congressman, I cannot tell you how many cases, although I
will-
Mr. Porter: You can do that for the record, can you not?
Mr. Gould: I think I can do it for the record. I will certainly attempt to
do it for the record. I think that you raise in your comments three
points. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to be able to respond to
20091
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received by the Republican members of the House Labor
Appropriations Committee. Subsequently, their deregulatory zeal
diminished, even prior to their loss of congressional control, and
them. Let me take the last first. The question of asserting jurisdiction is
something that Congress decided for us through the Landrum-Griffin
Amendments of 1959. The jurisdictional yardsticks which were last
revised in 1958 were frozen in effective in the Landrum-Griffm Act of
1959. Only a revision of the proviso in section 14(c)(1) would allow us
to decline jurisdiction by virtue of increasing the jurisdictional
yardsticks along the lines that you refer to. Section 14(c)(1) contains a
proviso which precludes the Board from declining jurisdiction over any
labor dispute over which it would assert jurisdiction under the
standards prevailing on August 1, 1959. As you know, that came out of
a very difficult period in the 1950s of detailed litigation arising under
preemption doctrine and was part of the compromise the Congress
arrived at.
Mr. Porter: We would disagree with your interpretation of that section
and believe that it was never written with that understanding because in
1958 there was no inflation in the economy; that you could interpret
that more broadly.
Mr. Gould: Not only do my predecessors agree with me, including
Chairman Dotson who was appointed by President Reagan, but the
House Subcommittee on Government Operations in a statement that it
issued in 1984 expressed a similar point of view. From a policy point of
view, it was also noted Member Zimmerman's view that if we begin to
deny jurisdiction, of course that will in and of itself be a litigation-
producing device which will expend more of our resources. I might
say-
Mr. Porter: Let me interject if I may, Mr. Gould, that you could suggest
this to the authorizing committee of jurisdiction and I'm certain that
they would be interested in listening. Of course, this would not leave
the parties without recourse. The States would have jurisdiction, would
they not?
Mr. Gould: If Congress changed the law, States-
Mr. Porter: In other words, since 1958 inflation has grown and we have
gobbled up more and more jurisdiction that was traditionally left to the
States previously. Why not go back to where Congress thought it ought
to lay in 1958?
Mr. Gould: That would be a policy matter that Congress might want to
revisit and reconsider. The pros and cons of that, Mr. Chairman, are
detailed and something that the appropriate congressional committee
may want to revisit.
Hearings Before a Subcomm. on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 104th
Cong., 1289-91 (1997). See also id. at 1299-1301 (exchange between
Representative Ishtook and Chairman Gould on jurisdictional thresholds).
The material provided for the Committee was Bernard D. Meltzer, with Robert J.
LaLonde, Inflation and the NLRB: A Case of Fortuitous Regulatory Expansion, 4
REG. 43 (1980), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv4n5/v4n5-
7.pdf and ROBERT J. FLANAGAN, LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LITIGATION
EXPLOSION (1987).
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there the matter has been left undisturbed since. However, even
though they were wrong on the law, i.e., only Congress, not the
Board, could provide that more jurisdiction be declined or
withdrawn, their position may nonetheless be good policy. The
effect of the freeze coupled with a half-century of inflation has
been to bring many very small employers within the Board's
jurisdiction-employers who may be beyond the reach of other
regulatory statutes that frequently establish jurisdiction over
employers who employ a particular number of employees.
Now, as part of comprehensive labor law reform, small
employers concerned about the impact of new, more effective labor
legislation should renew this issue. The Board's jurisdictional
yardsticks could and should be indexed for inflation, now and in the
future, thus leaving regulation within the hands of the states. The
major question today, as in 1959, is which law applies: federal or
state? The weight of authority at present is that the state courts are
free to apply state law but are not required to do so.
112
This approach, if retained as part of the 2009 or 2010
amendments, has the dual virtues of taking new jurisdiction away
from the NLRB at a time when labor law reform could
substantially increase its caseload and court activity at the same
time that its membership is diminished from five to three-and
would allow the states to act as laboratories, as Justice Brandeis
once advocated, 1 3 to go beyond the protections afforded under the
NLRA or amended federal law for small employers. 1 4 For
instance, the states could devise statutory machinery that would
allow employees to bring complaints to a state administrative
agency or a court of general jurisdiction without the prosecutorial
blessing of a state General Counsel, a requirement of federal labor
112. Eatz v. DME Unit of Local Union No. 3 of IBEW, 973 F.2d 64 (2d Cir.
1992); Kempfv. Carpenters Local Union No. 1273, 367 P.2d 436 (Or. 1961) (en
banc). Both cases arrived at the same conclusion-that states are free to apply
their own laws-based on the legislative history surrounding the passage of the
1959 Landrum-Griffin amendments.
113. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
114. Henry H. Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign States: Preemption and the
Second Twentieth Century Revolution in the Law of the American Workplace, 62
FoRDHAM L. REv. 469 (1993); Henry H. Drummonds, Reforming Labor Law by
Reforming Labor Law Preemption Doctrine to Allow the states to Make More
Labor Relations Policy, 70 LA. L. REv. 97 (2009).
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law today."15 Punitive and compensatory damages above and
beyond triple damages and fines could be authorized.
The argument will be made that states hostile to unionization,
like Mississippi or South Carolina, should go below federal
protection. Though this seems undesirable as a matter of policy, it
might be a necessary accommodation in the interest of a grand
compromise, which will surely be necessary for bipartisan support.
VIII. RULEMAKING
The question of whether the Board should use its rulemaking
authority as a substitute for adjudication in certain areas has been
discussed in detail for years. 16 There are at least two areas where
rulemaking is particularly appropriate. The first is where there has
been enormous litigation because of confusion about certain issues
that come up time and time again. A good example of this is the
acute health care industry, where the Board engaged in rulemaking
for the first time, its authority to do so being approved by the
115. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484
U.S. 112, 126 (1987). The Court speaking through Justice Brennan referred to
the General Counsel's "concededly unreviewable discretion to file a complaint"
and held that any General Counsel function that can be characterized as
"prosecutorial" is not subject to review by any other entity under the Act.
116. See Merton C. Bernstein, The NLRB'S Adjudication-Rule Making
Dilemma Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571 (1970);
Cornelius J. Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor
Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729 (1960); Cornelius J. Peck, A Critique of the
National Labor Relations Board's Performance in Policy Formulation:
Adjudication and Rule-Making, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 254 (1968); Clyde W.
Summers, Politics, Policy Making, and the NLRB, 6 SYRACUSE L. REv. 93 (1954).
The NMB, which serves as an analogue to the NLRB on recognition issues in
the railway and airline industries, has long made use of its rulemaking powers.
29 C.F.R. §§ 1201-9 (majority of rules published in 11 Fed. Reg. 177A-922
(Sept. 11, 1946)). Moreover, the NMB has recently decided to create a new rule
regarding the certification of representative elections which will follow NLRB
practice by certifying collective bargaining representatives on the basis of the
majority of ballots cast in an election as opposed to the number eligible voters in
the election. Representation Election Procedures, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,750 (Nov. 3,
2009) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. §§ 1202, 1206); see R.C.A. Mfg. Co., 2
N.L.R.B. 159, 179 (1936) ("The right of the Union to be certified as the
exclusive representative must be decided solely by reference to Section 9(a) of
the Act. That Section, as shown above, provides that the organization receiving
a majority of the votes cast at an election shall be the exclusive representative
for collective bargaining."). However, disputes sometimes arise over whether a
sufficient complement of employees have voted. See Glass Depot, Inc., 318
N.L.R.B. 766, 767 (Chairman Gould, concurring) (concluding, as with political
elections, the ballot should not be upset because a snowstorm or force majeure
prevented some employees from casting their ballot).
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Supreme Court. 117 Litigation was diminished and the process was
successful.
When I was Chairman, I proposed, with Board concurrence,
that the process be used where the law was quite clear as it was
with regard to the presumption that single-location bargaining units
were appropriate.' 1 The difficulty with these cases, however, was
that although the Board had continuously agreed on the critical
criteria to be used-(1) the geographical distance between the
locations in question; (2) the amount of interchange between
employees at the different locations; and (3) common supervision
-the applications of (1) and (2) were always unclear. That is to
say, in some instances the combination of a particular geographical
distance and an amount of interchange would uphold the
presumption, but if one of these factors were altered in another
case (i.e., a shorter distance or fewer instances of interchange), the
presumption could be rebutted. Here, the principle was clear, but
the application of it invited continuous and wasteful litigation. This
litigation fostered delay. Delay, as we have seen in other contexts,
undermines the policies of the Act.
But this was the difficulty in this particular portion of
rulemaking. It became clear that many business groups thought
that if the process moved quickly, employees, particularly low-
income employees in service, restaurants, and the like, would be
more likely to vote for union representation. In this context,
employer groups found one of the major policy benefits of
rulemaking particularly troubling.
The principal virtue associated with rulemaking is that through
its notice and comment process it invites substantial public input
and, therefore, the rule devised incorporates more of the stare
decisis gravitas. That is to say, quite frequently the Board has
oscillated from one doctrine to another after hearing a case where a
limited number of lawyers, i.e., usually the lawyers representing
the immediate parties themselves, have appeared. Reversal of
precedent under these circumstances is itself more susceptible to
subsequent reversal. Policies promulgated in the context of
rulemaking where the input is more considerable do not lend
themselves to such oscillation.
117. Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606 (1991) (approving
Appropriate Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,347
(Apr. 21, 1989) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 103.30 (2008))).
118. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Appropriateness of Requested
Single Location Bargaining Units in Representation Cases, 60 Fed. Reg. 50,146
(Sept. 28, 1995) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 103); see also NLRB v. Wyman-
Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969) (stating in dicta that the NLRB has the power
to engage in rulemaking).
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Of course, the existence of term appointments rather than the
life tenure given to judges necessarily lends itself to political
influence. Each President can influence the policy of the Board
immediately with new appointments, and all, since the time of the
Eisenhower Board, 119 have done so. The opaque and necessarily
ambiguous language of the statute itself, i.e., prohibitions against
"interference," "restraint," and "coercion," lend themselves to
policy judgments that Congress is unprepared or ill-equipped to
make in a particular category of cases.
But my Chairmanship demonstrated the difficulties with
rulemaking-almost as much as holding oral argument. The
benefit of adjudication is that it can be done in the middle of the
night, so to speak, as we did in holding that undocumented workers
were entitled to back pay under the Act.'20 Holding oral argument
on, for instance, the rights of contingent employees to be part of
the collective bargaining process, as well as engaging in
rulemaking, simply served to generate opposition on the part of the
Republican Congress by virtue of its opposition to the NLRA
itself. Now, with a new Obama Board and a Democratic Congress,
the environment is more hospitable to collective bargaining in the
NLRA. Rather than simply reverse the numerous flawed Bush II
Board decisions, the Obama Board might be better served by
engaging in rulemaking in a variety of areas, particularly where the
principles are reasonably clear but the application of them is not.
The important point here is that the reversals from one Board
to another-Eisenhower, Kennedy-Johnson, Nixon-Ford, Carter,
Reagan, Bush I, Clinton, Bush II, and Obama-can go on
endlessly, and in some measure these kinds of swings involving
policy are inevitable even in the process of the life-tenured
judiciary. But they represent particularly sharp swings where each
President can so immediately influence policy (they would be able
to do this less so under my proposed amendments because terms of
office would be eight years, not five), and respect for legal
principles is diminished in the process. In some measure the
careful, deliberative, public input that is involved in rulemaking
can reduce this tendency, and, again, the Obama Board should start
the process where the Clinton Board was unable to do so because
of political pressure from a hostile Republican Congress.
119. See Summers, supra note 116; W. Willard Wirtz, New National Labor
Relations Board: Herein of Employer Persuasion, 49 Nw. U. L. REv. 594, 594-
95 (1954). For a thorough general discussion of rulemaking, see Anne Joseph
O'Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the
Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REv. 889 (2008).
120. GOULD, LABORED RELATIONS, supra note 84, at 134.
121. Id. at 176-78.
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IX. CONCLUSION
The existing body of labor law and its administration is in need
of a substantial, if not clean, of the past. The recognition process is
impaired, and this matter can be addressed through expedited
elections and postal ballots (the latter long contemplated under the
Act and under the Railway Labor Act as well! 7). The debate
about card check is a diversion from the attempt to obtain a process
that allows employees to fairly hear opposing views, yet does not
both extend the period of debate and unfair influence and coercion
unduly and allows unions and employers to bring their message to
the employees in the central forum for debate, i.e., the workplace.
Canada has been this way before and, after an experiment with
card check in the 1960s, has gradually shifted to use of election
machinery-but in the case of Ontario and British Columbia, more
effective and expedited machinery is used.
The same approach should apply to decertification elections.
Curiously, the ability of employers to engage in self-help where a
union majority may be in question, i.e., by simply refusing to
bargain and thus requiring litigation of the union's future status in
lengthy unfair labor practice proceedings, has been strengthened
by the card check approach and the idea that a process other than
elections should be the preferred method. The same approach
should apply to both situations, and employers should be restricted
from utilizing refusal-to-bargain litigation and required instead to
file decertification petitions just as unions must do under existing
law and the statute, if amended along the lines that I advocate.
The road does not end, however, with certification. As
Professors Ferguson and Kochan have demonstrated, the problem
for collective bargaining is a major one where the relationship is
fragile in the wake of a certification. Part of this fragility can be
remedied by changing the course of some of the refusal to bargain
case law, such as the duty to provide information in cases where
the employer is unwilling as well as unable to pay. The union
ought to have access to company financial information and the
ability to pay in the collective bargaining process without
utilization of a Truitt-type ritual where the employer is obliged to
open the books only if it says the right (or from its perspective,
wrong) words in response to the union's demands. Workers ought
to be in a position to know the economic facts of life, which will
make collective bargaining move more smoothly in first contract
situations and elsewhere.
122. San Diego Gas & Elec., 325 N.L.R.B. 1143 (1998).
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But the need is particularly strong in first contract negotiations,
where the relationship is embryonic. This is why arbitration, not
after a specific time but rather where there is a certification that the
process is dysfunctional in some sense of the word, should be
permitted-albeit a baseball final-offer arbitration and one that
takes the form of recommendations and subsequent collective
bargaining before finality.
Beyond effective sanctions, the problem of delay can be
diminished through both specific time limitations within which the
NLRB is required to act as well as better appointments-and one
of the ways to obtain the latter is through one-term Board
Members. This will not remedy the problem, but it can only help.
Professor Mackenzie's concern with the loss of "transcendent
purpose" in the appointment of Washington insiders continues on,
at least in part, with the Obama Administration. "Change," the
campaign slogan of the President in 2008, could be furthered in the
labor law arena if reappointments were denied, the number of
Board appointees reduced, 123 and the caseload expedited. This
could be furthered through a diminution of the caseload, with both
rulemaking and the cessation of jurisdiction taking into account the
amount of inflation that has occurred over the past half century
clearing out some of the backlog underbrush.
While flawed in some respects-it is right to propose
strengthened sanctions and to enhance NLRB injunctions-EFCA
has been an important first step in realizing effective and balanced
labor law reform. Now it is up to Congress and the President to
pursue this objective sensibly. The chance to do so does not come
often.
123. Though I am of the view that more work can be done with fewer
members, I recognize that this idea is counterintuitive and, in any event,
impracticable in the contemporary political appointment arena.
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